A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME” AND PATTERNS OF CRIME IN NIGERIA: AN EXPLORATION OF METHODOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS
CHAPTER TWO:
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK EXISTING EXPLANATIONS FOR CRIME IN NIGERIA
Normal Crime
What explanations have been offered for the three categories of crime in Nigeria? Explanations for normal crime tend to emphasize the social and psychological dislocation experienced by Nigerian society and individuals as development is sought and slowly achieved. Few systematic and data based studies have been conducted, however. The following studies fall into the “modernization leads to crime” school. This perspective has dominated the discussion of crime in developing countries (e.g., Neuman and Berger, 1988).
Oloruntimehin (1992) explains trends in crime rates by citing the social dislocation and economic pressures brought on by political instability, uneven economic development, high unemployment, white-collar fraud and corruption, rapid migration to the cities with a consequent lack of amenities, and high degrees of anonymity in urban areas. In short, crime, especially property crime, arises from the impact of changes in structural factors on individual life chances.
Adeyemi (1990) concludes that only a systematic and integrated effort to understand, measure, and react to the multiple problems created by uneven economic development, urban migration, inadequate and misguided education, cultural anomie, and an inefficient and nonlegitimate criminal justice system will be able to prevent crime. Crime also increases by the failures of policymakers to implement well-constructed plans that address the needs of development and the population.
Using information collected from personal interviews with convicted armed robbers, Ekpenyong (1989) attempted to assess the influence of personal factors on the commission of armed robbery. In the end, Ekpenyong (1989) argues that general (capitalist) economic conditions are the root cause. Armed robbery is “the logical outcome of differentials in access to valued goods” (Ekpenyong, 1989:33). This is reinforced by the anomic conditions of Nigeria in which “standards governing behavior have lost their influence and are ignored” (Ekpenyong, 1989:31) by all. Armed robbers aspire to the same material possessions that the rich have achieved by criminal means. They emulate on the streets, by robbing with a gun, what bureaucrats and capitalists steal with a pen.
Ebbe (1989) examined the geographic distribution of crimes and delinquencies in Lagos. He found that most were concentrated in the high and medium rent residential districts of the former capital city. Ebbe concludes that patterns of juvenile delinquency in Lagos are:
products of heterogeneity of the population
due to the influx of native and foreign migrants
and resulting conflicts of value. . . . Under con
ditions of a lack of social integration created by the heterogeneity of the population and the resultant weak social control coupled with the bad economic conditions, some of the migrants and juveniles become enmeshed in crime and delinquency. (Ebbe, 1989:764)
Modernization, urbanization, and low levels of economic development create incentives and opportunities for crime.19
Odekunle (1978, 1986b), in contrast, represents a second major school of thought, which views the dynamics of underdevelopment as the major cause of crime and links all criminal acts in Nigeria to the nature of its political economy. Making and enforcing laws serves the interests of the dominant foreign and internal elites. Their crimes are ignored while those of the working and lower classes, who commit crimes in order to survive in an unequal economic and political system, are selected out and punished by the criminal justice system. The causes of crimes cannot be found in peculiarities of individual character or general normlessness. The (corrupt) norms are quite clear and enforced in favor of those in power.
Odekunle (1986b: 118) argues that the most significant difference among adjudicated delinquents and their age cohort lies in “parental background with particular reference to occupation, level of education, paternal mortality, number of wives, martial stability and familial residence.” He concludes that the children of the well-to-do are protected from arrest and adjudication by their parents’ status, while the less advantaged delinquents are caught and processed through the delinquency system.
Political and Economic Crimes
Explanations of elite corruption and political- economic crimes tend to stress individual traits (e.g., greed, selfishness, lack of moral integrity), as well as the almost irresistible lure posed by quick financial gains within general conditions of poverty, uncertainty, social and political instability, a pervasive belief that everyone else is doing it, and a capitalist economic system that values individualism, competition, acquisition, and wealth (e.g., Abba et al., 1993; Achebe, 1983; Adamolekun, 1985; Watts, 1985).
Riotous Crimes
Explanations for riotous behavior in Nigeria tend to see riots as the inevitable outcome of a competition for scarce resources within presumed zero-sum contexts and a traditionally divided society. Violent group conflicts have historical roots in traditional practices, religious conquests, colonial policies, and an emerging class structure. Group conflicts reflect the continuous salience of subnational identities and loyalties, or the nonexistence of a national culture and value system. Such divisions are consciously exploited by politicians and exacerbated by the economic and social policies pursued by the government (e.g., Lu- beck, 1985; Sanda, 1992; Shettima, 1993).
With the exception of a few scientific (i.e., data driven and statistically analyzed) studies of criminality or normal crime, these explanations, especially for political, economic, and riotous crimes, reflect common sense or atheo- retical interpretations and specific knowledge of cases, events, and personalities. They all stress the fundamental importance of societal and economic contexts for any understanding of criminality, opportunities, motivations, or changes in patterns of crime. Can a theoretically grounded approach—the general theory of crime —help one understand the existence and prevalence of all categories of crime in Nigeria more accurately or completely?
THE GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990:15) argue that individuals who commit crime, which they define as “acts of force or fraud undertaken in pursuit of self-interest,” are characterized by low levels of self-control —the core explanatory concept in their general theory. Following classical criminological theory, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) accept that individuals are governed by pain and pleasure and self-interest calculations. They lack any innate conscience which extends beyond themselves and must be socialized to morality. Whether the pursuit of self-interest leads to criminal or to legal and nondeviant acts (i.e., self-interest pursued without fraud or force) is determined by levels of self-control, opportunities to experience pleasure or avoid pain, and situational constraints, for example, “the sense of immunity experienced by the offender, such things as darkness, anonymity, and vulnerability of the victim” (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1989:63). More specifically, everything else being equal, those individuals with low levels of self-control are more likely to commit self-interested acts of force or fraud than individuals possessing high levels of selfcontrol. High self-control is a “barrier that stands between the actor and the obvious momentary benefits crime provides” (Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1993:53). Low self-control, or the propensity for deviance and criminality, leads to all forms of crime in all groups and all places and times. Levels of self-control also structure an individual’s general success in life. This propensity is, itself, a bundle of traits: aggressiveness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, low intelligence, indifference to punishment, recklessness, pleasure orientation, or physical strength.
Some researchers have operationalized selfcontrol in complex ways. Grasmick et al. (1993) and Arneklev et al. (1993) identify six fundamental components of low self-control. Any attempt to evaluate the applicability of self-control theory, they argue, will prove more accurate using these components. First, individuals with low self-control are prone to impulsive behavior. They will act to fulfill immediate pleasures, lacking the foresight to weigh short-term gains against long-term advantages.20 Other components are a preference for simple tasks and easy courses of action; seeking immediate gratification over longer, more complex and fulfilling tasks; risk and thrill seeking behavior; a preference for physical activity instead of mental or cognitive activity; self-centeredness characterized by indifference or lack of sensitivity toward the needs and suffering of others; and temper, a lack of ability to resolve conflict through mature discourse, opting instead for physical confrontation.21
Levels of self-control (as are the various components) are fixed early, during childhood. If a child does not receive proper parental supervision or is not handed out appropriate punishments for improper (or deviant) behavior, then the child will develop lower levels of self-control than if proper socialization had taken place. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990: 177) maintain that, once established, low levels of self-control will remain intact and unaffected by other conditions throughout the individual’s life. Low levels of self-control alone do not explain crime, however. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) argue that the opportunity to commit crime must also exist. The individual must have easy access to objects, or find himself or herself in situations where crime can be committed with little perceived risk and obvious and immediate rewards. Further, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) note the importance of age in committing crime —that is, as one ages, the propensity to commit crime declines.22 These three characteristics —propensity (or criminality), situational opportunity, and age—in concert and in conjunction, lead to crime.
The shortcomings of this general theory have been widely noted. The variables—crime and criminality —are so loosely defined that they cannot be operationalized consistently.23 Dependent and independent variables in the theory are indistinguishable, for as Hirschi and Gottfredson (1993:49) note, “The best indicators of self-control are the acts we use selfcontrol to explain: criminal, delinquent, and reckless acts.” The theory is tautological (Akers, 1991:204). Hirschi and Gottfredson (1993:52) view this criticism as a “compliment,” for it shows that they “followed the path of logic in producing an internally consistent result.”24 Further, the theory is impossible to disprove on its own terms, for “data apparently contrary to the theory carry weight” (Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1993:51) only when supported by an alternative theory. Merely empirical falsification is not enough. Lastly, the operationalized equation of self-control with acts (the tautology or logical consistency) undermines a basic assertion of the theory. Self-control (including criminality) is an internal condition; individuals possess it to different degrees. Acts (crimes), on the other hand, result from the balance of pressures created by internal motivations, objective and perceived opportunities, and age. The conceptual or logical problem is this: if self-control is indicated by criminal acts, then opportunities and age are unnecessary for measurement of explanation. If opportunity and age matter, then internal states cannot be indicated by acts determined by the balance of external and internal forces.
Despite such conceptual critiques, much effort has been expended to operationalize the variables and test the theory’s predictions. Factual support of many assertions is clearly contradictory, leading the authors to “perform wondrous mental gymnastics” (Palumbo, 1992:538) and “intellectual contortions” (Tittle, 1991:1610) to reconcile theory and reality. The most widely criticized factual assertion of the theory is that white-collar criminals have the same low levels of self-control as street criminals.25
For example, Benson and Moore (1992) analyzed the criminal records of both white- collar and street criminals to test the notion that white-collar criminals are both criminally versatile and equally prone to engage in deviant behavior as common offenders. Although some white-collar criminals were found to engage in other deviant acts as frequently as common offenders, the majority of white- collar offenders did not.26
The above are universal criticisms of the theory. What additional conceptual problems arise when the cross-cultural and comparative validity of the theory are examined?
THE EXPLANATORY STATUS OF THE GENERAL THEORY IN NIGERIA
Normal crime, which closely resembles western crime and delinquency (e.g., burglary and robbery), is perhaps the most appropriate category of Nigerian crime the general theory could explain. Still, the explanations offered by researchers who have done specific studies in Nigeria do not lend much support to the lack of self-control as the major cause of crime patterns they studied; this is as true for those who commit armed robbery as it is for female offenders. Contexts are judged to be of greater importance. Since the researchers did control for the level of self-control in their studies, they may not have found its absence.
It would be difficult to disprove the theory if one assumes that there will be, among Nigerians as elsewhere, a significant number of low self-control individuals (in roughly the same proportion to the general population as elsewhere) who have opportunities to commit crimes. The main empirical problem for the theory are the low rates of crimes in Nigeria. It is obvious that numerous opportunities for crime exist in the general conditions of Nigeria, and, if modernization and underdevelopment arguments are accepted, they occur more frequently there than in developed countries. Crime rates should be high. (As noted above, it is unlikely that compensating for even massive underreporting and recording inefficiencies would raise the rates enough.)
Supposing that actual crime rates are comparatively low (though to an unknown degree), then Nigerians in general have high levels of self-control compared to citizens of other countries with vastly higher crime rates (e.g., the United States). Certainly, selfcontrol would have to be much more prevalent in Nigeria than in the United States. One would be hard pressed to theorize why socialization patterns during periods of social change, modernization, or underdevelopment and anomic conditions would lead to a high incidence of high self-control individuals. Both the modernization and the underdevelopment theories would indicate the opposite— high numbers of low-self-control (anomic or alienated) individuals.
As noted previously, many Nigerians live in conditions of poverty and have few legitimate opportunities. Although the majority of Nigerians do not engage in serious, violent crime, many individuals are essentially induced by opportunities27 or forced by their life situations to commit illegal acts in order to survive,28 or they engage in crime as a form of social protest (e.g., Freund, 1982). One must seriously question if all of these individuals possess low levels of self-control, or whether having a self-interest in survival and few legal opportunities is not itself a counteracting force leading people to transgress the barrier of high self-control. This possibility creates an additional theoretical complication: similar criminal acts do not indicate similar levels of low self-control, for each individual may experience the force of circumstances differently.
Armed robbery is a good example of the complex interactions of propensity, situational opportunities, and political contexts that label the act. Even if one accepts that armed robbers have low self-control (which has not been shown), such low self-control cannot explain the fluctuations in the types and incidence of armed robbery over time, or the fact that much armed robbery is organized and planned. The condemnation of armed robbery also reflects underlying ideological perspectives and political realities. Some armed robbers acquire an almost “Robin Hood” status and are praised in the press, despite their killing and robbing of innocents and the police, as working-class revolutionaires fighting a government controlled by a comprador bourgeoisie (Marenin, 1987). To most, armed robbery is a symbol for everything that has gone wrong; to others, the armed robber is a man who struggles against an unjust fate.
The utility of the theory for political- economic crimes also is doubtful. Economic crimes, at high and low levels, are mostly opportunistic crimes, done for personal or family gain.29 The chance to receive a bribe, for example, depends fundamentally on opportunity—that is, being in the right position at the right time and having the proper connections and access. In such cases, risks are low and the potential for gain makes it a worthwhile gamble for all actors involved.
Depending on how seriously one takes the notion of opportunities in the general theory, economic crime by both the elites and the working class could well fit the model. The answer depends on one’s perception of the prevalence of economic crimes. The common consensus among Nigerians is that practically everyone engages in such acts. If that assumption is close to reality, then low levels of selfcontrol should be extremely prevalent among Nigerians. This argument, of course, conflicts with the low incidence of normal crime, unless one can show or argue that opportunities for normal crime are far less frequent and more constrained than the economic crime.
That is a possible argument. Formal social control (i.e., the police or the courts) is not considered a serious deterrent for any of the crime categories by Nigerians. There is little evidence that the police even think about deterring; they are much more concerned with their organizational and individual survival and with handing out punishment, informally and often illegally, to whoever displeases them. Informal social controls, which exist even in modern, urban settings, may be effective in limiting opportunities to normal crime and in sanctioning offenders. Informal control and its underlying social organization, however, work in two different directions. It may discourage or deter normal crime, but may actually encourage political-economic crime through communitarian and family demands to share the wealth.
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) do not discuss political crimes in their book; however, by their definition, such acts are crimes and expressions of low self-control. On the face of it, that assertion rings false. Both electoral fraud and state repression are planned, organized, and done with a view to the future — the victory of a party and the spoils that come from capturing the state or the attempt to maintain the powers and privileges of officeholders. Such acts would not be committed unless the criminals took a long-range and considered view of their interests and the prospects of promoting them within the general contours and dynamics of their society.
Riotous crimes result from traditional patterns of social relations, whether over land ownership, military civil relations, religious antagonisms, regional divisions, political animosities, or class preferences, all reenforced by conditions of development/underdevelopment. Many riots are organized and planned and only require a specific incident, which to an observer may appear quite insignificant, to erupt.
Many student riots start over the quality of food served in the dining rooms, raids by outsiders on female students whom male students consider to be their property, or in memory of students who lost their lives in past riots. To become a university student in Nigeria requires tremendous effort and intelligence, for the ascent from primary to secondary to university education is steep and the top of the pyramid extremely small. University students are the most academically successful and rewarded members of the younger generation (Carter and Marenin, 1980). They see themselves and they are viewed by their society as the “future leaders of the country” —a widely used phrase. The pettiness of their grievances, which lead to riots, would suggest extremely low levels of self-control (or high arrogance), but their very status as students contradicts that label.30
Religious riots can start from imagined slights, such as a reference in a sermon to which offense is taken, or a rumor about a planned march by one religious organization through the territory of another. Religious or ethnic riots, which are based on strong identifications with a specific cultural and value system, are not adequately explained by the general theory for a fundamental reason.
Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) general theory is a theory about (im)prudent and impulsive behavior; that prudence and what is fraud and deviance are defined by the dominant value system. Imprudent individuals have failed to incorporate the dominant values of society into their psyche and motivations and, hence, act as deviants against the dominant social consensus. In contrast, people socialized to self-control and prudence do not act in criminal and deviant ways (i.e., they avoid force and fraud) because they do not reject the controlling standards and values of their reference group.
At the core of the theory is the assumption that a dominant referential value system exists in society and that it functions as the standard of judgment for prudent, forceful, and fraudulent behavior, and that such standards are built into the legal and professional conceptions of crime enforced by the state and the community. Those who have not been properly socialized do not act within the demands of the value system and are deviant; they lack self-control. In religious and ethnic riots, two opposing value systems clash. It is precisely because individuals adhere to their dominant value system (i.e., they act as Christian against Moslem, or as Hausas against Ibos) that they engage in criminal acts as defined by the encompassing national legal system.31 It is because of the disjuncture between the society-wide system, which lacks support and consensus, and the subnational value system, which is salient, that riots occur. Religious affiliation and ethnic membership are more important as guidelines and motives for action than being a Nigerian citizen.32
In short, the explanatory and predicting power of any theory is severely limited when its central assumption does not hold. The differential values base of riots also calls into question the cross-cultural universality of the general theory. The definition of crime, based as it is on fraud, assumes that fraud and force have universal meanings. This clearly is not the case. Force can range from forceful persuasion to a gun to the head to structural conditions. What would be considered fraud in business transactions or in gaining government contracts might be considered good business practices in another setting. These practices, themselves, are based on traditional forms of gift-giving or the obligation one feels to channel the rewards one controls (e.g., admission to a university) toward members of one’s family and community. Demands from the family and the community on the “son of the soil,” the “big man” who has succeeded are multiple, legitimate, and powerful in Nigeria.33
Corruption, which involves force or fraud by definition, comes in many forms and is judged differently by the Nigerian public. Brownsberger (1983:221-26) distinguishes polite, nepotistic, and alienated corruption. He argues that the first two forms are close to traditional forms of gift-giving or assert social obligations and, hence, are accepted and expected, while corruption done for purely personal gain is new and condemned. Peil (1976) found that the public distinguishes different levels of corruption. Small-scale forms are understood and accepted as an almost necessary adjustment to difficult times; however, large- scale forms (that is, elite corruption) raise the anger of individuals.
Underlying the public’s ambivalence about corruption are two basic attitude sets: views of the state and of family ties. The state and its offices are seen, in Joseph’s (1983) well- known characterization, as “prebendal” in nature. Public and private interests and values are not kept distinct, and the use of state power for private ends is an accepted stance. The second attitude, family matters, views the family as a nested set of circles expanding to include the community and sometimes fractions of an ethnic identity. The family demands loyalty and help. When a person has reached a position of power or authority, that person is obligated to help his or her family (widely defined). Prebendalism and family ties are mutually reenforcing; acts done to serve one’s groups are less corrupt than the same acts done to serve another group.
NIGERIAN CONTEXTS
Crime is committed within specific contexts. Nigeria is a developing country that is more fortunate than others. It has oil. At the same time, the population of the country is approximately ninety million people, which simply means that the needs of the population are greater than even the vast amounts of money generated by the oil industry can meet. Among the consequences of a large and growing populace are a small and declining per capita income, the development of massive and visible differences in wealth and lifestyles, the salience of classes in public life, and the possibilities for large-scale corruption (e.g., Anybody seen a giant?, 1993; Forrest, 1993; Ihonvbere, 1994).
Nigeria has been characterized by political instability. Military and civilian governments have rotated in power. A massive civil war during the late 1960s (Biafra) killed over two million people, left the economy in ruins, and helped enshrine a legacy of ethnic distrust at the heart of politics. There is little certainty among the public about the future, little trust in government and leadership, and little expectation that political stability will take hold (e.g., Achebe,1983; Diamond, 1988; Falola and Ihonvbere, 1985).
The country has a history of social divisions—by regions of the country; by birthplace and “indigeneity,” that is, origin and membership in a particular state of the federation; ethnic affiliations; religious beliefs; ideological dogmas, and class distinctions. Much of public and private life is consumed by the struggle to live with and overcome divisive tendencies within the country. The federal structure of the country was the colonial and is the current ideological and political solution (Oyovbaire, 1984).
Despite these many obstacles, Nigeria is on the path to development. New social, political, and economic institutions are emerging, yet older forms remain. Much of daily life is still governed by routines that find their basis and legitimacy in traditional communal arrangements. Much crime and disorder are handled informally because of a widespread distrust of formal social control institutions and the belief that informal mechanisms yield immediate and just solutions. Adeyemi (1990: 182) summarizes the impact of informal control on crime reporting and crime control by stating, “It is clear that the informal procedure of crime control is applied in most cases, except in the serious cases or in case of strangers who are in no relationship with their victim or with someone known to the victim.”
In short, crime in Nigeria occurs within contexts that are characterized by conflicts, political instability, extreme differences in economic well-being, uncertainty about the courses of future events, and a shifting balance of formal and informal social control mechanisms.