LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 INTRODUCTION

Our focus in this chapter is to critically examine relevant literatures that would assist in explaining the research problem and furthermore recognize the efforts of scholars who had previously contributed immensely to similar research. The chapter intends to deepen the understanding of the study and close the perceived gaps.

2.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

REVOLUSION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

The concept, Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), evolved from the ideas developed by the Soviet military theorists in the early 1970s. The Soviet concept on the matter was more limited than an RMA, as it was called a military-technical revolution; showing that the primary focus of Soviet theorists was on revolutions in military technology (Galdi, 1995). Hence, while applying their new concept to the changes in military affairs that took place before the 1970s; Soviet theorists concluded that two military-technical revolutions have so far taken place in the 20th century. The first of these revolutions, according to Soviets, took place during, or soon after, World War I, as it was “driven by the emergence of aircraft, motor vehicles and chemical warfare;” while the second, was “driven by the development of nuclear weapons, missiles and computers in World War II” (Galdi, 1995). The same Soviet military theorists even attempted to outline the nature of the next “military-technical revolution;” which, according to them, “would involve advances in microelectronics, sensors, precision-guidance, automated control systems, and directed energy” (Galdi, 1995). And in retrospect, while the revolutionary nature and significance of these changes in military technology is open to question, it is clear these Soviet theorists have succeeded in correctly predicting which technologies will play the leading role in future warfare. Hence, the present paper will seek to show that a revolution in military affairs (RMA) is a theoretical concept which does not seem to be applicable to the changes in military affairs that have been taking place since the last decades of the 20th century. However, the characteristics attributed to the alleged, current RMA, by its various proponents, are fairly uniform; indicating that there is a considerable amount of consensus regarding the general changes in military affairs that are currently taking place. According to Galdi (1995), a revolution in military affairs (RMA) takes place when one of the participants in a conflict attains immediate victory through a new combination of new technology, organization, and doctrine; and moreover, when anyone who wishes to overcome that participant “must match or counter the new combination of technology, organization, and doctrine.” Thus, “The accomplishments of the victor become the necessary foundation for any future military activities in that area of conflict.” The reason why the specific area of conflict must be empathized is that the elements of a new RMA (e.g. microelectronics and sensors), may be countered, in another area of conflict, by some elements of former RMAs (e.g., an electronics-frying electromagnetic pulse from a nuclear blast) (Galdi, 1995). A good illustration of a proposed, specific RMA of the past, as well as the importance of all three factors of technology, organization, and doctrine, in creating an RMA, is given by the battle that led to the Fall of France in 1940, at the hands of German invaders. As it turns out, the capabilities of the belligerents were a reverse of what one would normally expect in such cases. The allied forces of France, Britain, Belgium, and Holland, that were defending France, clearly outnumbered the German force that attacked them. And in the opinion of General Ludwig Beck, who was the Chief of the German General Staff at that time, the French Army was “the strongest in Europe” (Cowan, 2007, p. 4). Moreover, “The French had the best tanks in the world and the allies had an overall advantage in the number of divisions, tanks, aircraft, and artillery pieces.” And yet, within six weeks, the allies were defeated by the Germans and suffered over 2.2 million casualties, while the Germans suffered only 150,000 (Cowan, 2007, p. 4). The explanation for such a surprising outcome to this battle is said to lie in the following factors. The Germans synchronized “the technology of the tank, airplane, and radio” and combined “the storm troop tactics of 1918 with the use of the Indirect Approach” (Cowan, 2007, p. 4). This combination of technology, organization, tactics and doctrine allowed the Germans to execute [their attack] with such speed that it made it look like the Germans belonged “to an entirely different period of human history.” The French applied the tank and the airplane as singular systems. They employed the tanks as infantry and artillery support weapons. They did not consider the strategic impact of combining these technological advances. Mired in outdated doctrine, they failed to see and understand the military power that emerging technology could achieve when combined with changes in doctrine and strategy. (Cowan, 2007, ) Another rigorous definition of an RMA comes from Hundley (1999). Hundley (1999, p. 9) defines an RMA as a “paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations” which either (1) makes irrelevant or obsolete “one or more core competencies of a dominant player,” or (2) creates at least one new core competency in a new dimension of warfare, or (3) both. This definition contains a number of key terms which are worth elaborating on. The core competencies, as used in the above definition, refer to those fundamental abilities that create the foundation for a set of military capabilities. For example, a core competency of today’s U.S. Air Force is its ability to detect from the air and attack with precision weapons any vehicular targets on the ground (Hundley, 1999, p. 9). A dominant player is a military organization which has “a dominating set of capabilities in an area of military operations.” For example, the U.S. Air Force is today’s dominant player in air-to-ground attacks and air-to-air combat (Hundley, 1999, p. 10). The dimension of warfare is a medium on which warfare is conducted. Until the 20th century, the only two dimensions of warfare were the surfaces of the earth (land warfare) and water (naval warfare) (Hundley, 1999, p. 10). In the 20th century, warfare rapidly expanded into other mediums, especially underwater (undersea warfare) and air (air warfare), “and the homelands of the combatants (strategic warfare and intercontinental warfare).” More recent, potential dimensions of warfare, which have not yet been employed, include outer space (space warfare) and cyberspace (information warfare) (Hundley, 1999,). A paradigm shift refers to “a profound change in the fundamental model underlying a segment of military operations.” The blitzkrieg paradigm that was used by the Germans during WWII (as described above for the battle leading to the Fall of France in 1940), involved armoured forces of high mobility breaking through enemy lines and rapidly penetrating to the rear (Hundley, 1999, p. 10-11). This was a great change in the basic model of land warfare. Up to that point in history the core competency of ground forces consisted of dominant infantry and artillery forces, which the blitzkrieg paradigm rendered obsolete and was therefore an RMA (Hundley, 1999,). However, “There are several interpretations of the exact number and constituent elements of earlier revolutions in military affairs” (Galdi, 1995). Moreover, “Most true revolutions in military affairs have only been recognized after they have taken place.” And, quite possibly, when it comes to the military conflicts of the past, the victorious side, that was the prime mover of the new RMA, could have viewed as merely evolutionary, the same changes in military affairs that the losing side and history viewed as truly revolutionary (Galdi, 1995). Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that if an RMA is currently taking place, it would appear evolutionary and spanning a considerable interval of time, at least from the perspective of military theorists that study the changes in military affairs of the most militarily advanced nations. It is doubtful, however, that an RMA can be said to be currently taking place at all, or can be expected to occur in the near future. After all, since the middle of the twentieth century, technological change has been very rapid, accelerating, and unavoidable (Galdi, 1995). Thus, technological change, which happens to be “one of the major elements needed for a revolution in military affairs … is now always present.” Moreover, “rapid societal change and organizational adaptations by military forces” are also constantly taking place (Galdi, 1995). Alternatively, it can be argued that even though there neither is occurring, nor will occur, a single RMA, “there will be a series of almost continuous revolutions” in military affairs (Galdi, 1995).

2.2 Military Revolutions and Technological Change

The last decade of the 20th century has witnessed an unprecedented transformation in international security. An unexpected transition from a bipolar to a unipolar America-dominated world order, following the implosion of the former Soviet Union, trends toward a more 'polycentric' global dispensation and a crucial metamorphosis in the very character of warfare appear to be unleashing strong forces of strategic fluidity and uncertainty. The foremost global trend transforming the security framework is the dramatic growth in information technology and the revolution in military affairs (RMA) it has created. Technological change may well revolutionize warfare in the 21st century. Countries that can exploit emerging technologies and synergise the same with innovative operational doctrines and organizational adaptation could doubtless achieve far higher levels of relative military effectiveness. It would be seen that, historically, leading countries, including the United States, had adequate time to adapt in the midst of war to military technologies that developed in peace time. Such a luxury is now precluded by the sheer pace of technological transformation and the paradigmatic change in warfare itself. In the coming years, it would be crucial for political leaders, military establishments, civil services and defence research scientists to stay alert to evolving and exploiting emerging technologies so that technological asymmetry can be sustained against competitors and adversaries.In the historical context, there is also the view that the current RMA is not only one, but part of a series that evolved from the Middle Ages to the present day, enhancing in the 14th century and continuing with increasing frequency as one neared this century. This historical record appears to suggest that technological change represents a relatively small part of the equation, the crucial element in most RMAs being conceptual in nature. On the other hand, dramatic advances in information technology have begun to transform the very character of war and its conduct. The Gulf war was in many ways the prototype of the shape of wars to come. As a result of RMA, it marked the beginning of a demassification of soldiers in opposition to the Clautzwitzian principle of mass and concentration. In fact, there is only one example on the list of possible RMAs that is entirely technological: nuclear weapons. But even here, there is some ambiguity since the impact of nuclear weapons has been almost entirely political except for their first use against the Japanese. 1 Throughout history nations have always pursued innovation to increase relative military effectiveness. It is the acceleration of evolutionary technological change combined with associated operational and organisational transformation that altered the character of war over the last two hundred years. Some of these developments which progressively shaped the eventual technological metamorphosis are:

Railways, telegraph, steam-powered naval ironclad and rifle. (Between Napoleonic Wars and American Civil War)

Change over from wooden sailing ships to steam powered armoured hulls. (Latter half of 19th Century)

Machine gun, aircraft, submarine, main battle tank and armoured fighting vehicles. (Prior to World War I)

Internal combustion engine, improved aircraft, radio and radar. (Before World War II)

Nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles. (World War II and after)

Information Technology and micro-chip advances, laser, satellite applications (Latter quarter of 20th century)

It needs to be reiterated, however, that even as technological advancement would serve as a prerequisite for RMA, technology by itself cannot provide enhanced cutting, edge cost-effectiveness. In the bitzkrieg during World War II, for example, which struck a profound change in the very language and grammar of warfare, the Wehermact inflicted a quick shock defeat on a qualitatively comparable, numerically superior force through innovative exploitation of the triad of aircraft, tank and radio. By combining speed, surprise and deception with superior tactical and operational performance, the Germans attained a level of operational superiority to which the allies were unable to adapt in time. At another level, in a recent example, during the limited border war between India and Pakistan in the summer of 1999, the alacrity with which the Indian Air Force changed its operational strategy for strikes against Pakistan Army positions in the high Himalayan mountain tops (average height 15000-18000 feet) paid it rich dividends. Persistence with the initial direct attacks against extremely mobile, highly camouflaged, Stinger-equipped troops may have had questionable value.

History would appear to suggest that the synergistic effect of common preconditions of technological developments, doctrinal innovation and organizational adaptation alone could enable full realization of RMA. It is the increasing recognition of the importance of the doctrinal and organizational elements that has led to the term RMA gaining currency over expressions such as military technical revolution (MTR) which implied that technology alone was the predominant factor. Also, mere invention of new technologies is not enough, these must be developed into practical military systems, or a system of systems as technologies become more complex. While the tank was introduced at Cambrai in 1917, it was years before it was reliable and robust enough to spearhead ground advances. Herein, also lies the need for creativity and innovative skills to harness military technology. Thus, while tanks and aircraft were the operational creations of countries other than Germany, it was Heinz Guderian of the German General Staff who integrated these as weapon components of the doctrine of blitzkreig. Its success required not only "technology of the tank and a coherent doctrine of armoured warfare but also substantial organisation and even cultural changes which got reflected in the new combined arms operations centred on the German Panzer Division." 3The stunning victory of the western armed forces and their allies in the Gulf War of 1991 could doubtless be ascribed to the efficacy, reach and lethality of air power which has taken a quantum jump through employment of significant force multipliers like Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), Joint Tactical Information Distribution system (JTIDS), in-flight refueling, satellite aided navigation, precision-force technologies etc. Revolutionary advances in some of these 'sensor', 'shooter' and range-extending technologies may also dramatically transform the capabilities of air power in long range strikes and in enhancing its role as the primary sword arm of a conventional deterrent. In the United States, the Air Force has a lead in major C4I2 effort in its JTIDS for providing single and joint data link network for high capacity information exchange among joint forces.Intelligence gathering techniques are getting revolutionized, with the electronic eyes, ears and blindfolds moving from ground-based platforms to air based ones and finally to space. Detection and deception will be the key determinants of success or failure. Phase array radars and towed decoys are the two technologies which will not only make possible the simultaneous monitoring of a great number of tracks but also provide a totally unambiguous picture if deception is desired. A great quantum of strategic literature has emerged in recent years on the possible emergence of a new RMA which will lead to over-arching changes in the nature of conventional warfare. "Such a revolution may be driven by the rapidly developing technologies of information processing and stealthy, long-range precision strikes."( Knox,2001) Without intending to dilute the criticality of doctrinal innovation and organizational adaptability, the impact of information technology on RMA has the potential to alter the very character of battle spaces in the conventional context. Such a defining change warrants a comprehensive examination.

2.3 Information Technology and RMA

Accurate and timely information has always been eagerly sought by armed forces and defence planners throughout history. Two thousand years ago, salience of information management was extensively articulated by the Indian thinker and military strategist, Kautilya. Gengiz Khan, the Mongol conqueror, was the master of employing horse cavalry in outflanking forays against enemy dispositions for vital information gathering prior to the main offensive. Today, advances in technology have made vast amounts of information virtually available at the click of a mouse. Alvin and Heidi Toffler's theory on three waves of warfare distinguishes between agrarian, industrial and information age societies. They postulate that societies wage war in the same way they make money, animals and labour were the valued resources of the agricultural age; machines and fossil fuels had the same impact for the industrial age, while information would be the crucial resource of the current third wave. A new type of warfare would seek to exploit the ongoing developments in knowledge-based information age warfare so as to enable armed forces of nations to attain their politico-military objectives. The beginnings of this trend are already upon us. In evolutionary terms, the character of war, like all other forms of complex and collective human behaviour always changed gradually. Change-cycles of the industrial age were spread over hundreds of years; there was a ring of familiarity to changes, which served as markets for the future. But the sheer pace of mutation in information technology has compressed change cycles dramatically. Also, even as politically there is a trend of reduced motivation for developing military technologies, information technology having a bearing on conflict is, ironically galloping and has "transformed economic and social life in ways that hardly need elaboration. The variety and ever expanding capabilities of intelligence gathering machines, and the ability of computers to bring together and distribute to users the masses of information from these sources, stem essentially from the information revolution. Small wonder that a group of senior marine corps officers (in the United States) are reported to have studied the operations of the New York Exchange to see how brokers absorb, process and transmit the vast quantities of perishable information that are the life-blood of the financial markets. ( Knox,2001) The advent of top-end reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) technologies, satellites for navigation, communication and surveillance with optronics, synthetic aperture radars (that see through clouds) and sub metre resolution (perhaps now openly available) would provide military leaders with startling capabilities to garner highly accurate intelligence. India's limitations on this count, during the limited border war thrust upon her by Pakistan in Kargil during the summer of 1999, are now sought to be addressed on the highest priority. The Indian Air Force is said to have initiated a 12-day long reconnaissance campaign to identity Pakistan Army locations before effective battlefield strikes could be undertaken. Significantly, ninety percent of these technologies are really commercially driven and available off the shelf provided one is not on the wrong side of the export sanctions list! It has perhaps rightly been said that an ounce of silicon and effective information exploitation may be worth more than a ton of uranium!

2.4 RMA and Information Dominance

Information War is a vast subject and only a few salient issues are being addressed. As a radically new form of conflict, it is an important adjunct to RMA and implies any action taken to delay, exploit, corrupt or destroy the enemy's information and its functions and protecting own side against those actions. Each side would endeavour to shape enemy action by manipulating the flow of intelligence and information. The adversary could also be swamped with data or information he believes true, altered drastically. An overpowering success in information war would provide the side which has attained its "information dominance." There may be need to create a relative "information dominance" before one embarks on a venture against the adversary even as precautions are simultaneously in place against information overload. The latter, resulting from a desire to know everything can have a highly deleterious impact on ones decision to act towards an end result. Also, carefully selected images and information can be broadcast to targeted group of individuals-generally policy makers, opinion shapers, armed forces leadership etc. President Saddam Hussein's retreat order to his troops in 1991 and evacuation of 118 aircraft to Iran is an example of how an information campaign phase of future conflict can virtually win an entire war before the first weapon has been fired. Not surprisingly, a Chinese analyst 9 perceives a 'peoples war' in the context of information warfare being carried out by "hundreds of million of people using open-type modern information systems. He asserts that political mobilization of war must rely on information technology to become effective, for example, by generating and distributing 'political mobilization' software via the internet, sending patriotic e-mail messages, and setting up databases for traditional education. Openness and diffusion effect of the Internet can be expanded to help political mobilisation exert its subtle influence". The Gulf War also demonstrated how information could be both a weapon and a target. Right at the start, 78 pre-selected command and control nodes were the first ones to be struck with missiles and bombs, and it was clear that 30 minutes later Iraqi units were shut off from higher echelons without intelligence or direction. It is more than possible that such operations in future may instead use information as a weapon and strike by means of 'computer viruses', 'logic bombs' or 'Trojan horses' bringing to the fore the question of informational vulnerabilities. As 21st century societies become increasingly information dependent, their vulnerability to manipulation of information would also be correspondingly enhanced. Countries may choose to directly attack each others communication and computer networks through subversion rather than the traditional route of destruction. This type of warfare takes place on a level battlefield. For example, the design, development and manufacture of an advanced high technology aircraft many involve a huge investment but the production of a devastating computer virus to wreck it could be affordable even by the most impoverished government. There has to be a determination to see through the seller's gimmickry on hardware and employ non-standard communication protocols. All these are considered mandatory to ensure redundancies and minimise vulnerabilities to the extent feasible. During the Spring '99 conflict with Yugoslavia "the Pentagon considered hacking into Serbian computer networks to disrupt military operations and basic civilian services. But it refrained from doing so...because of continuing uncertainties and limitations in the emerging field of cyber warfare". The belief persisted that by penetrating computer systems that control communications, transportation, ports, airfields, energy and other services in a foreign country, cyber weapons may not only impact military operations but have the cascading effect of disrupting civilian life as well and thereby raising nettlesome, legal, ethical and practical problems. In Yugoslavia, the US defence department is said to have advised commanders to apply the same "law of war" principle to computer attacks that they do to the use of bombs and missiles. Conceptually, cyberwar is still at a nascent stage even in the United States though an Information Warfare Centre, a Battle Laboratory and a dedicated Information Warfare Squadron have already been established in its Air Force and many other such centres are in the offing. China's efforts to develop "all conquering technology" for internet offensives against finance, commerce, telecommunications and military networks and software counter-measures in information deception addressed in an article in the Liberation Daily elicited a predictable response. Commenting on this, Richard Allen, the former National Security Adviser said "the Chinese obviously were trying to send a message...and possibly overstating their capabilities, but it indicates a potential adversary's intent." In another Chinese view on future warfare, Maj Gen. Wang Pufeng avers "in the information age it will be necessary not only to eliminate the enemy's war making "material base" but also to control and destroy the enemy's information systems which will be the primary assault targets. Limits of war will be expanded into outer space because the key information war systems of space monitoring positioning, guidance and communications systems will all be deployed there...Information war will shorten the time of battle, make combat more integrated, change the substance of force concentration, with precision strike and stealth being dominant. In the balance of army, naval and air force might, the ratio of army troops will decline, while that of naval and air force troops will grow." ( Howard,1994) The Chinese assertions on RMA, heavily influenced by Western concepts, are being translated into a national priority to building up across the board missile, aircraft and ship-based power projection capabilities.

2.5 Relationship between the RMA and combat effectiveness.

It would not be an exaggeration to state that the RMA may well change the basic relationship between offence and defence, space and time and fire and manoeuvre. RSTA capabilities offered by the new technologies enhance situational awareness by several orders of magnitude. It has been said that the industrial revolution affected a hundred fold improvement in productivity. The micro-electronic technological transformation has enhanced productivity in informational applications perhaps by a factor of about a million. How would this impact conventional operations? Transparency of war spaces in real time, made possible by continuous control, communications computers, intelligence and interoperability (C4I2) spectrum, compresses the time factor, substantially. Time as a resource also gets transformed: there is obvious compression of time and expansion of space. War fighting in the fifth dimension of time would compel the armed forces leader to exploit the activity cycle of information, decision and action far more quickly, effectively and precisely than the adversary if he has to emerge successful. Digital situational awareness compresses detection-to-engagement or sensor-to-shooter time scales and provides opportunity to synergise employment of joint combat power of the Army, Navy and the Air Force against precisely focused elements of the enemy's centres of gravity.Improved information processing techniques and pattern recognition may soon provide highly effective and automated decision support systems. Combined with technologies that provide dominant battlefield knowledge, such systems offer to the military commander exactly what he seeks: a high degree of asymmetry against his adversary. "The introduction of long range precision weapons, delivered by aircraft or missile, together with the development of intelligent mines that can be actuated from a remote location means that sophisticated armies can inflict unprecedented levels of destruction on any large armoured force on the move."(Eby,1997) Masking large scale armoured movements or building up safe rear areas chock-a-block with ammunition dumps and truck convoys will become increasingly difficult as countries gain access to space-based reconnaissance, unmanned aerial vehicles and accurate strikes by combat aircraft. It is these techno-combat paradigmatic shifts that have placed major limitations on conduct of conventional operations and brought to the fore the concept of 'limited' border wars. Nuclear weapons in the hands of adversaries and the fear of escalation of a conventional war provide further justification to attain political objectives through limited border conflicts. Doctrinally too RMA has a major impact. In the West, technologies have invariably tended to drive doctrine. But for developing countries, doctrines would have to fit onto available technologies until they are able to develop the same for specific military applications. Another distinct trend is that platforms like aircraft, ships, tanks and guns etc will be less reflective of military power than the quality of what it carries by way of sensors, munitions, avionic suites, communications etc. The first long-range precision strike may prove decisive as happened to the Iraqi air defence system during the Gulf War. With the growing possibility of pre-emption as an incentive, information war and sabotage of computers, and perhaps even non lethal warfare may be the new combat elements in the future.

2.6 IMPACT OF RMA IN WARFARE

The revolution in military affairs is not driven merely by a series of technologies. Technology is certainly a necessary, but by no means sufficient, condition in RMA. Insofar as it constitutes a revolution, RMA is the growing ability of major states and particularly the United States to integrate different technologies.( Eby,1997)The integration of technologies also suggests changes in social organizations and in the skills base and other human resource aspects of developed society. What is revolutionary, therefore, about RMA is the integration of technological elements and an ability to handle some of the social and organizational changes that accompany such integration. Whether this constitutes a genuine revolution is a matter of perception, but there is a general consensus that at the very least this represents a rapid and dramatic change in the potential for war-fighting on the part of the United States and of some its major allies. The United States sets the war-fighting trend which affects the military development policies of many other nations in the world and which comes to shape the reactions of most other military powers in one way or another. There are six main areas in which the revolution in military affairs has already had some effect and where its implications are beginning to be manifest in ways that arms controllers have to encompass. Firstly, RMA has created a great deal more precision in certain key elements of war fighting. Precision guided munitions are now commonplace among the major Western allies though not in as great numbers or capacities as is commonly thought but now Western powers do not contemplate major military operations except where they can deliver ordnance in precise ways. Secondly, RMA provides an ability for the major military powers to use such potential in standoff or stealth weapons platforms. Stand-off weapons platforms such as aircraft, missiles, ships or long range artillery of various forms allow military powers to deliver precision ordnance without taking undue risks themselves. The use of stealth technologies offers the promise of deploying weapons platforms in potentially dangerous proximity to an adversary, but reducing the risk by making the platforms near invisible to tracking radars or other sensors. Thirdly, RMA is driven by remarkable developments in communications technologies and the ability to integrate different forms of communication and sensors. It is possible at least in principle for the major military powers to obtain an accurate and total picture of the battlefield in which they are interested. If knowledge is power, then knowledge of the battle-space during a military engagement is war-winning power of a very high order. Traditionally, battles have been won by those who can penetrate the fog of war most successfully and quickly and those who make the fewest mistakes. In the RMA age to come, certain powers will be capable of penetrating the fog instantly, imposing it as a one-way problem on an adversary, and dramatically cutting down on the potential for tactical (though not strategic) mistakes on their own part.( Feaver,2003) What the military refers to as the sensor-toshooter relationship has entered a realm where commanders may have a high ability to see almost all that an adversary is doing and target it accurately at very short notice: this is the 'Holy Grail' of military command. The fourth element of RMA rests in what might be termed suppression technologies the ability to restrict or suppress the military capacities of an opponent without destroying them or otherwise frustrating their effectiveness. The potential of such technologies is enormous and raises the possibility that a dominant power could effectively hobble the traditional military capacities of an opponent, without large-scale civilian or even military casualties, and without risk to its own forces. All of this, fifthly, is based on an ability to generate and absorb continuous technical innovation and to apply that innovation in a very short time. In the industrial warfare of the twentieth century our perspectives were of technological changes which took twenty to thirty years to find applicability and perhaps another ten years to be introduced and operationalized in a military sense. In the postmodern warfare of the twenty-first century, we will increasingly think of innovation over a ten-year period and operationalization over perhaps two to three years. As military technology becomes more knowledge-based and subject to software innovation, the gap will grow between industrial-age military machines and post-industrial military powers. Finally, not least, RMA is based on the ability of modern societies to integrate many of these aspects into total systems and systems of systemsprecision technologies, stand-off technologies, communications, suppression technologies and modern research and development techniques capacities that can have, in theory, a potentially devastating war-fighting effect. The point is not only that technologies change quickly, but that they go on changing quickly in a continuous cycle of innovation. Those societies who can cope with such a demanding cycle and adjust to it, never living merely on a particular technological plateau, will be the beneficiaries of revolutionary military change that is likely to separate them from other societies more completely than the industrial age separated the imperialists from the subject peoples of the nineteenth century.( Braji,2014)