AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF NEPAD TO AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE: CASE STUDY OF THE AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM (APRM)

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0 INTRODUCTION

Our focus in this chapter is to critically examine relevant literatures and theories that would assist in explaining the research problem and furthermore recognize the efforts of scholars who had previously contributed immensely to similar research. The chapter intends to deepen the understanding of the study and close the perceived gaps.

Precisely, the chapter will be considered in the following sub-headings:

• Literature review
• Conceptual review
• The Definition of Development
• The Definitions of Governance and Good Governance
• The Measurement of Good Governance Indicators
• Theoretical framework
• Critiques of the theory
• Relevance of the theory
• Theories of Governance and Development
• Linking Governance with Development
• Africa’s development challenge in the post-independence period
• The Good Governance and Development Agenda in Africa

2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

Governance in Africa

Ake (2001) in his book “Democracy and development in Africa”, indicates that African countries obviously have sandwiched among different types of regime. He points out that, there have been instances of movement between military dominance and civil dominance; a mixing up of the monarchical government system; and a change between parliamentary, presidential and hybrid governing systems. According to Oluwole & Bissessar (2012), in pre-independent Africa, the colonial institutions, especially the judiciary, provided controls and balances to curb excessive leadership and prevented the reaching of the Schelling threshold. However, the battle for power and the desire to hold onto power for life became the prevailing objectives of many African leaders as soon as they became independent after the 1960s and 1970s (Oluwole & Bissessa, 2012).

Meredith (2005) also in his work points out that there was great prestige and honor for the first generation of African nationalist leaders. Among these were; Julius Nierere of Tanzania (1961– 1985), Kwame Nkrumah (186–1954) of Ghana, Modibo Keïta of Mali(1960–1968), Léopold Senghor of Senegal (1960–1980), Houphouët–Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire (1960–1993), Sékou Touré of Guinea (1958–1984), Sylvanus Olympio of Togo (1958–1963), Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya (1963–1978), Abdel Nasser of Egypt (1956–1970), Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda (1964–1991), and Malawi’s Hastings Banda (1963–1994) (Meredith, 2005). Oluwole & Bissessar, (2012) also point out former long-standing dictators in Africa including, Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo, Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Salassie, Moammar Gaddafi of Libya, Omar Odimba Bongo of Gabon, and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. Likewise, Robert Mugabe's of Zimbabwe, Angola's José dos Santos, Teodoro Mbasosgo of Equatorial Guinea, and Paul Biya's of Cameroon are some recent dictators who have been in office over more than three decades (Meredith, 2005).

Meredith (2005), further notes that the decolonization of Africa in the 1960s was subjected until the early 1990s to a stifling Cold War influence, hence, to this end, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Libya, Somalia, Angola, Namibia, Egypt and South Africa's political history has been subjected to the Cold War era dynamics. Meredith’s (2005) argues that, from the euphoria of liberation in the 1950s and 1960s, to the violent obscurity of dictators and civil wars, the African continent crisscrossed until the 1990s when the road to true democracy and good administration began to be clear. Patrick, Olusola and Alaba (2016), in their work observe that, there is no doubt that the end of the Cold War and the subsequent emergence of a ‘New World Order’ in the 1990s produced major impacts on the world system. Obviously, African states were not exempted from the postCold War radical and transformative impacts as previous autocratic military and one-party genre regimes that had dotted the continent less than a decade after independence in the 1960s began to collapse (Patrick et al, 2016). As a result of an upsurge of dissatisfaction with poor economic management, corruption, expediency, nepotism, cronyism and violence, most African leaders were forcibly ousted from their positions (Meredith, 2005). Overall, the wave of democratization that swept away authoritarianism in Africa was largely the result of internal and external forces pressure on states (Patrick et al, 2016). Adetula (2011) notes that, African governments were under considerable pressure from the neoliberal world order, which later set the road to reform which culminated in various forms of liberal democratic transition. He again notes that, in addition to the external pressures, it is plausible that the internal pressures opened the path to political reforms in the 1990s.

Democracy and Good Governance in Africa

Adetula (2011) in his work opines that the initial euphoria for liberal democracy's possible global success was short-lived. The global number of elected governments has seen significant growth, but many new democracies–most of which are from Africa–have been labeled ‘incomplete democratic transitions’ and ‘illiberal democracies’ by the West (Adetula, 2011). Lynch & Crawford (2011) also in their work note that, early optimism about this ‘second independence’ or ‘virtual miracle’ had waned after a decade of political liberalization. Wani and Suwirta (2015) opine that, democratic movements have supported constitutional and political changes and reforms in numerous African countries which require elections and civil, economic, social and political liberties. They point out that, in Sub-Saharan Africa, there were around 44 elections between 1996 and 2006, with approximately 26 presidential and twenty-eighth parliamentary elections in Africa between 2005 and 2007 (Wani & Suwirta, 2015).

In spite of the establishment of constitutions, legislators and electoral systems, the democratic ‘tests’ reported unimpressive outcomes in several African states (Adetula, 2011). Also, Olusola and Alaba (2016) further postulate that, the pathologies of illiberal democracies, corrupt and benevolent political regimes have had and continue to have far-reaching socio-political and economic consequences for the welfare of citizens in Africa. Hence, poverty has been consolidated, reflecting corruption’s wasteful resources and distorted investment. Likewise, Chronic tax drain continue to dissipate essential resources for direct and indirect investment, as a result of capital flight ibid. Lynch and Crawford (2011: 277) demonstrate that, regrettably, there was no total removal of military rule from African politics by the ‘third wave’ of democracy that swept the continent. Indeed, fifty attempted coups were conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa, of which thirteen succeeded, between 1990 and 2001. Lynch and Crawford (2011: 277) illustrate the various successful coups across the continent with examples. They cite that, there were successful coups in Guinea Bissau in 1999, 2003, and in 2009, President Vieira was murdered by soldiers. Authoritarian rule and military intervention have also continued to hit Mauritania. Accordingly, Mauritania’s return to liberal democracy in 2007 ended with another coup in August 2008, after a military coup in 1992, 1997 and 2003 ibid. In 2008, when Captain Moussa Dadis Camara captured power in a bloodless coup following the murder of Lansana Conte, Guinea also experienced military occupation.

Development in Africa

As postulated in Meredith’s (2005) work, the African Independence Honeymoon had been short, though memorable. African leaders, who ran the crest of popularity, pursued the task of development and nation-building with energy and enthusiasm; embarked on ambitious plans, bright young men rose up quickly (Meredith, 2005). The author argues that, the awful promises of nationalist politicians in favor of power, promise of education, medical care, employment and land for all had raised the sense of euphoria to a still greater level. Heidhues (2013) explains that, Africa’s growth prospects looked great at independence in the early 1960s. Development indicators in Nigeria and Ivory Coast were better than those in Indonesia, as well, Congo, Ghana and Uganda were comparable to those of South Korea. (Heidhues, 2013: 339). The author however notes that, since the late 1970s, the gap between Asian and African development growth has slowed down and widened despite huge development aid quantities (US$ 500 billion since 1960). Per capita GDP was stagnating in Africa, global trade was declining, and limited variety of primary commodities dominated African exports (Heidhues, 2013: 339).

Ake (2001) posits that, the main problem in Africa was not that development had failed, but because development was not part of the plans of the rulers who replaced the colonizers. He explains this by indicating in his work that, colonialism’s political legacies do not promote an endogenous strategy for development. During the colonial era, the idea of oppression, indifference, coercion seems to have continued to prevail in the post-independence experiences of most African states. Ukwandu and Jarbandhan (2016) note that, several decades after independence, most countries in Africa still remains a part the world’s least developed country. Accordingly, thirtythree African countries were regarded as Least Developed Countries (LDCs) as at 2010. The key characteristics of these states were absence of inclusive development, poverty and underdevelopment, absence of fundamental necessities such as water and electricity, lack of employment opportunities and decent shelter (Ukwandu & Jarbandhan, 2016). Ake (2001) points out that, development in post-independent Africa had been designed as a distinct process, independent from politics, culture and institutions, thus, there had been no political development.

Heidhues (2013) establishes that, in the late 1970s, African countries started to decrease by the major social and economic indicators. Agricultural output dropped, leading to huge imports of foodstuffs, investments and savings rates were small during this time, while Africa’s foreign debt was growing from 5.4 trillion dollars in 1970 to 41.3 trillion dollars in 1980 (Heidhues, 2013: 400). The Author adds that, industry as well as production had decreased. Ukwandu and Jarbandhan (2016) attribute these economic challenges Africa was facing to the fact that, some politicians while in authority acquire all the benefits of economic growth, without changing the lives of the public. Hence, the authors in their work note that the focus of development in Africa should be on enhancing opportunities for people living in poverty, reducing poverty, improved healthcare, improving education quality, reducing child mortality, among other things.

2.2 CONCEPTUAL REVIEW

2.2.1 The Definition of Development

According to Onyekpe (2004:133), development is a genetic term which encompasses the transformation of the economy, state and society through the achievement of greater capacity to deal with the challenges of: production and its expansion; political administration and governance; and organizing the civil society as a community of people.

In a similar view, Todaro (2003) takes a holistic study of development that covers every facet of human endeavor. In his opinion, development is a multi-dimensional process involving the re-organization and re-orientation of the entire economic and social systems. In addition to improvement in income and output, it typically involves radical changes in institutional, social and administrative structures as well as in popular attitudes, customs and beliefs. Development in the sense Todaro perceives, should transform a people economically, socially, culturally and politically. It is development that improves their standard of living, stabilizes the polity, provides the social needs as well as ensures that moral values and beliefs of the people are upheld.

To Gideon Agbyoko (2010;23) “development means a process whereby the people of a society increase their capacity to satisfy their needs through the exploitation of the resources within their environment by organizing the abilities and energies of the people to exploit at such resources.” This notion of development depicts a process that is multi-dimensional in nature and in which human beings compete among themselves as social forces to cause change to take place in their material existence (Rodney,1972). The overall goal of development as argued by Adedeji cited in (Agbyoko 2010) is the improvement of man and his environment. Supporting this view, Ibi-Ajayi (2003) clearly identifies the goals of development particularly in Africa as follows:

1. To increase the availability and widen the distribution of basic life sustaining goods such as food, shelter, health and security.
2. To raise the levels or standards of living in addition to higher incomes, the provision of more jobs, better education and greater attention to cultural and human values all of which will serve not only to enhance material well-being but also to generate greater individual and national esteem. To expand the economic and social choices available to individuals and nations by freeing them from servitude and dependence not only in relation to other people but also the forces of ignorance and human misery. From the foregoing, development attempts to deal with societal problems of poverty, malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, lack of decent shelter, insecurity, and unemployment among other ills. Thus, the hallmark of development is to as much as possible, reduce those obstacles that inhibits attaining higher standard of living so as to maximize the potentials of the people to enable them live high quality life.

2.2.2 The Definitions of Governance and Good Governance

Governance is seen as the process of steering state and society towards the realization of collective goals. It points to the dynamic but problematic and often times, contradictory relationship between the state and society (Pierre and Peters, 2000; Balogun, 1998:33, Hyden, 1999, Stoker, 1998, Alcantara, 1998). In this direction, a meeting of ex experts convened by the United Nation Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) defines governance as “a process of social engagement between the rulers and the ruled in a political community. Its components are law making and standard setting, management of regime structures and outcome of the social pact”. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Adejumobi (2004:) views governance as “the totality of the exercise of authority in the management of a country’s affairs, comprising of the complex mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, and mediate their differences. It encompasses the political, economic, legal, judicial, social and administrative authority and therefore includes: government, the private sector and the civil society”

From the above, it can be deduced that good governance flows logically from the concept of governance. According to Mohiden (1997), governance becomes “good”, when it is operated in accordance with legal and ethical principles as conceived by society. In other words, good governance is a normative concept by which society seeks to provide a guide and direction to itself through standards and norms embedded in the practice of governance. The urge to steer state and society according to defined rules and procedures, and ensuring that governance in all its ramifications serves the interest of the greatest number of people in society through a collective participatory endeavor is the essence of good governance.

According to Ajene (2003:58), while modern democratic government offers the best prospect of good governance, democratic governance is not synonymous with good governance. Good governance therefore implies the following:

1. The promotion of the best wishes of the majority represented in the actual policies and progammes of constituted authority which best serve and promote those wishes.
2. The accommodation and tolerant of the yearnings and aspirations of the minority and discordant groups.
3. The principle of consultation whereby the wishes of the majority are not simply assumed but a policy strategy which involves consultation with the widest spectrum of society for the purpose of obtaining consensus over policy at all times is pursued.
4. The strict adherence to the rule of law at all levels of society. The adherence to the practice of accountability and transparency by leadership and others in political authority.

BC Smith (2007) outlines that Good Governance is an opening Policy for establishing strong determination, where decision makers are to create point of view after consensus period in institution for the decision making. The productive policy making for the institutional production is the prime objective of the concerning body. It pays an important role to reorganize the infrastructure of governing machine. The social and political problems’ identifications are expected on organization mechanism which needs administration for the implementation plan ,therefore, there shall be strong mechanism of Political and Social system for strengthening economical values are possibly achieved by the good governance .The good governance is the only source of providing fundamental rights freely.(BC Smith. 2007)

2.2.3 The Measurement of Good Governance Indicators

Good governance is a dynamic administration construct that embraces fast changing political, social and economic arrangements. It tries to transform the political, economic and social life of the citizens within the framework of parliamentary democracy. It assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of society.

According to Sharma et al (2013), good governance can be measured by the following indicators:

Accountability

Accountability is a key requirement of good governance. Not only governmental institutions but also the private sector and civil society organizations must be accountable to the public and to their institutional stakeholders. Who is accountable to whom varies depending on whether decisions or actions taken are internal or external to an organization or institution. In general, an organization or an institution is accountable to those who will be affected by its decisions or actions. Accountability cannot be enforced without transparency and the rule of law.

Transparency

Transparency means that decisions taken and their enforcement are done in a manner that follows rules and regulations. It also means that information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by such decisions and their enforcement. It also means that enough information is provided and that it is provided in easily understandable forms and media.

Responsiveness

Good governance requires that institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders within a reasonable timeframe.

Participation

Participation by both men and women is a key cornerstone of good governance. Participation could be either direct or through legitimate intermediate institutions or representatives. It is important to point out that representative democracy does not necessarily mean that the concerns of the most vulnerable in society would be taken into consideration in decision making. Participation needs to be informed and organized. This means freedom of association and expression on the one hand and an organized civil society on the other hand.

Consensus oriented

There are several actors and as many view points in a given society. Good governance requires mediation of the different interests in society to reach a broad consensus in society on what is in the best interest of the whole community and how this can be achieved. It also requires a broad and long-term perspective on what is needed for sustainable human development and how to achieve the goals of such development. This can only result from an understanding of the historical, cultural and social contexts of a given society or community.

Effectiveness and efficiency

Good governance means that processes and institutions produce results that meet the needs of society while making the best use of resources at their disposal. The concept of efficiency in the context of good governance also covers the sustainable use of natural resources and the protection of the environment.

Rule of law

Good governance requires fair legal frameworks that are enforced impartially. It also requires full protection of human rights, particularly those of minorities. Impartial enforcement of laws requires an independent judiciary and an impartial and incorruptible police force.

BC Smith (2007) gives the concept of Good Governance in context of equality of Political and Economic opportunities for establishing Civil Society. The society has progressive status with logical indicators by the composite Rules of Law. The man is free to keep ideology and has freedom to follow the conceptual idealism to implementation status by strong participation in Political ground, similarly; Good Governance ensures the maximum endorsement to Political Dynamics in society; one has to be comfortable for availing economic opportunity with the deliberate sense of freedom, which leads from grass root to the elite level equally, is the definition of Good Governance. The statement has declaration of idealistic civil society that drives to the regional prosperity. (BC Smith 2007)

Equity and inclusiveness

A society’s well-being depends on ensuring that all its members feel that they have a stake in it and do not feel excluded from the mainstream of society. This requires all groups, but particularly the most vulnerable, have opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being.

2.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Political Economy Theoretical Framework

The Political Economy otherwise known as the Marxian Approach or Class Analysis Approach. This theoretical framework is useful to this work because it provides an in depth understanding of issues, the interconnection of NEPAD projects and programmes with a view to know their class of origin, character and composition and the logic of their existence and future. Besides, the political economy approach penetrate deep into the processes that lead to NEPAD and APRM formation and its policies/projects by laying bare, their essence and thus explain concrete forms of their manifestations in Africa‟s development.

Moreover, it also provides us with the necessary tool for understanding the material production in Africa and the foundation of social forces and classes Africa (Momoh, and Hundeyin, 1999). As an approach it has both economic and political contents, just as NEPAD has both economic and political dimensions. Besides, the political economy theoretical framework provides us with a better understanding of political phenomenon like NEPAD which has institutional structure embedded in the African Union.

2.3.1 Critiques of the theory

However, this theory has been criticized for been economic based. It is important to note that it is not limited to economic issues alone as it equally examine the interconnected between economic, social and political issues which NEPAD tend to use to address issues of poverty, marginalization and underdevelopment facing the African continent. For instance, economic inequality has not allowed political democracy to function in Africa as political power tends to polarize economic power. As inequality tend to bring about repression on the lower class which is experience today in Africa.

2.3.2 Relevance of the theory

Barran, (1959) rightly observed that the political economy theoretical framework also enable us understand societal values and ethics in relation to the economic conditions of Africa. The widened gaps between classes in Africa (Property class and Lower class) has led to poverty of wants among the lower classes in Africa and this inequality has also led to increase in the level of social vices like theft, bribery, kidnapping, examination malpractices, prostitution e.t.c (Olawole, in Aina, 2007).

On the whole, the political economy theoretical framework helps us to understand the basis of social development in Africa. It also provides us with the basis of understanding social relations the various classes (Property class and Lower class) in the production process in Africa and show how those who own and control the dominant means of production (property class) and how they control all the facets of the African economy and make policies that will further promote and protect their interests as the detriment of the lower class.

2.4 THEORIES OF GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

The explicit concept of a “developmental state” is often traced to the analysis of Japan’s postWorld War II economic success (Johnson, 1982), with further refinements based on other East Asian experience (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990). The modern generalization and conceptualization of this approach can be attributed to Evans (1995), with his treatment of South Korea, Brazil and India, and the introduction of the notion of “embedded autonomy.” This modifies the Weberian idea of a capable, autonomous bureaucracy as the key implementer of state development policies, to emphasize that this group must also be “embedded” in society in ways that enhance information flows and “negotiation and re-negotiation of goals and policies” (Evans, 1995, p. 12). The intellectual influence of Weber also reminds us that there has been a much older tradition of recognizing the role of the state in development, in European cases such as France (for example, Loriaux, 1999) and Germany (Boldrin et al., 2012), as well as the earlier history of Japan (Horie, 1937).

The key role of autonomy in this narrative is familiar, that of avoiding political capture by the private industrial elites who were needed for implementing crucial aspects of economic development. Evans and Heller (2018), in their summary, emphasize the other preconditions for a developmental state, namely, a balance of power that included weak civil society, and landed elites that had been wiped out by war or revolution. The final piece of the story is the perception of national elites that development was necessary for national survival amid geopolitical threats. The balance of power and perceptions of survival threats were differentiators from other countries with bureaucracies that appeared to satisfy the condition of embedded autonomy, such as the Philippines (Kang, 2002; You, 2005).

One might even veer toward the view that what constitutes effective “embedded autonomy” depends on other, contextual and historical elements, and, furthermore, that the concept itself needs broadening (Evans, 2010; Routley, 2012), to the point where it cannot be a fundamental building block in understanding the developmental state. Indeed, the developmental role of the state may be too complex to be amenable to parsimonious answers (Bardhan, 2016).

Nevertheless, attempts at such theorizing abound, and we turn to alternatives that have received considerable recent attention.

Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) frame their understanding of what drives development in terms of economic and political institutions. Their key distinction is between “extractive” and inclusive” political institutions. Political institutions are the “rules that govern incentives in politics” (p. 79). They determine who has power and how that power is used. Centralization is necessary to allow for basic functioning of “the state” – which is conceived of again in terms of the Weberian “monopoly of legitimate violence,” but also as a coalition of interests. If political institutions distribute power broadly in society then Acemoglu and Robinson view them as “pluralistic.” Political institutions that are “sufficiently centralized and pluralistic” are “inclusive.” Otherwise they are “extractive.” Of course, there is a connection between economic and political institutions: extractive political institutions will tend to concentrate economic power, so that economic institutions are also extractive. The two go hand-in-hand, and one cannot expect inclusive institutions in one category to work with extractive institutions in the other category.

Acemoglu and Robinson would presumably frame “embedded autonomy” as part of the synergy of inclusive political and economic institutions. But in the case of countries like South Korea, political institutions were arguably not inclusive when economic development took off. Political power was concentrated, and perhaps so were economic institutions, in areas such as domestic competition policy. The discipline on rent extraction came from external competition and geopolitical threats and rewards. While Subramanian highlights China and India as outliers in a cross-section regression of GDP per capita on a democracy index, there may be other examples that do not fit well (Boldrin et al., 2012). So it may be that the framework of inclusive and extractive institutions, while identifying and labeling an interaction between politics and economics that is needed for development (the creation and distribution of economic rents), may leave out important factors, or not be analytically sharp enough. While Acemoglu and Robinson bring more focus on the “primitives” of the distribution of power, they may not sufficiently address the specifics of institutions such as the bureaucracy, and may overemphasize the priority of inclusive political institutions over economic institutions – the reverse causality from economic development to political inclusiveness may not be acknowledged enough.

North, Wallis and Weingast (NWW, 2009) take an approach that is similar in many respects to that of Acemoglu and Robinson. They frame their analysis in terms of “social orders.” A social order is a stable coalition of groups, each with its own leader. Leaders within the dominant coalition, in particular, have privileged access to resources, and their group members are their clients. Privileged access creates economic rents, which are distributed by leaders. A primary characteristic of any social order is the control of violence within a society: this explicit emphasis on control of violence is one differentiator from other theories of governance, but is consistent with the Weberian view of the state, and goes all the way back to Thomas Hobbes in the 17th century.

NWW distinguish between limited access orders (LAOs) and open access orders (OAOs). In the former, access to resources and rents is limited and personalized. An open access order access to resources is competitive and more impersonal. This translates into three “doorstep” conditions for an OAO: consolidated political control of organizations with violence capacity, support for perpetual “elite” organizations,4 such as government entities and private corporations, and rule of law for elites. LAOs are further graded into fragile, basic and mature orders. The first of these has difficulty controlling violence, and violence capacity is dispersed – organizations outside the dominant coalition (which is unstable) are not viable. A basic LAO does better on both fronts: violence control and institution-building, and the mature LAO does better still, but personalization and exclusion still matter. The OAO represents a difference in kind from LAOs, compared to the differences in degree among different gradations of LAOs.

The NWW focus is on coalition formation among groups in society, and the impacts of the distribution of power for the type of order that emerges and evolves. In that sense, it is related to Acemoglu and Robinson’s conceptualization, but it also seems to have more commonalities with ideas of “weak” and “strong” states, in the literature on the state and development, or the interpretation of that literature in terms of institutional economics concepts such as credible commitment (Bardhan, 2016). Arguably, NWW also have a sharper notion of political competition, especially in leadership contests, than the inclusive political institutions of Acemoglu and Robinson (Kotwal and Roy Chaudhuri, 2015). Both NWW and Acemoglu and Robinson have, in the background, models of market competition based on dispersed and assured property rights, something that is less firmly in the state and development writings of noneconomists. On the other hand, the NWW emphasis on control of violence (Gray, 2015) seems to limit their view of wasteful (Directly Unproductive Profit Seeking, or DUP – Bhagwati, 1982) rent-seeking, which could involve other socially costly behaviors besides violence. Gray also critiques the narrow perspective on human behavior associated with neoclassical economics, just when economics is incorporating behavioral and evolutionary considerations in models of social order and dynamics. She also highlights the underlying transaction cost perspective that has shaped the NWW approach and which is a hallmark of the new institutional economics.

A final related approach to be described here is the “political settlements” concept of Khan (1995, 2010). Khan sees this as related to, but more precisely defined than, the concept of a “social order.” Specifically, his definition is (Khan, 2010), “A political settlement is a combination of power and institutions that is mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic and political viability.” Noting the difficulty of defining power in any kind of general manner, Khan (2010) narrows it down to a game theoretic context: “the capability of an individual or group to engage and survive in conflicts.” He calls this “holding power.” In somewhat of a parallel to LAOs and OAOs, Khan distinguishes between clientelist and capitalist political settlements. However, he argues that the dimensions of variation in clientelist political settlements do not correspond to the gradations of LAOs posited by NWW. Furthermore, he argues that his pre-conditions for transition are not the doorstep conditions of NWW, but instead (p. 58) a sufficient level of “development and dispersion of productive ‘capitalist’ organizations.” There is much additional richness in Khan’s formulation, and in some ways it can also be seen as a bridge between the “developmental state” literature and the “institutional economics” rooted in game theory of Acemoglu and Robinson and NWW.

If Khan’s approach is a useful hybrid, it is also worth noting that there are many other contributions that are relevant as building blocks for theories of governance and development, beyond the four encompassing approaches outlined here. These include Olson’s (1965) pioneering work on collective action, Ostrom (1990) at a more micro level, and numerous formal models of social conflict or state-society interactions, such as Skaperdas (1992), Besley and Persson (2009), and Acemoglu et al. (2011), that provide parts of an overall understanding of the interaction between political and economic institutions.

2.5 LINKING GOVERNANCE WITH DEVELOPMENT

According to Larry Diamond (2005, a), good governance consists of several dimensions. One is the capacity of the state to function in the service of the public good. Effective functioning requires knowledge of the policies and rules that best serve the public good, and hence training of state officials in their various professional realms. Productive and resourceful civil services is all that Africa needs to develop. Another principle of effective governance is commitment to public good. This requires effective leadership which is lacking in some African countries. Commitment to public good is a viable option for Africa’s socio-economic development. A third dimension of good governance is transparency, the openness of state business and conduct to the scrutiny of other state actors and of the public. Transparency requires freedom of information, including an act to ensure that citizens can acquire information about how government makes decisions, conducts business, and spends public money (Diamond, 2005). Effective political and economic governance in Africa will not only make rulers accountable for their actions and decisions, but it would also enhance and promote rule of law in the continent. This will breed political legitimacy and stability in Africa. This is vital because development can only be meaningful and sustainable in a peaceful and conducive environment.

There is widespread agreement in the policy literature that governance is fundamental to development (DFID, 2006; ODI, 2006). The first public appearance of the concept of good governance was in a 1989 World Bank report on Africa which argued that ‘underlying the litany of Africa’s development problems is a crisis of governance’ (World Bank, 1989). This crisis was used by the Bank to explain why its policies of structural adjustment and economic liberalisation, which it had long been urging African governments to adopt, were not working. The tentative answer was that although the programmes and projects that the Bank had helped to finance were technically sound, the required administrative and government frameworks were not in place because of corruption, secrecy in policy-making, lack of accountability, disregard for the law, lack of concern for the private sector and political exploitation of the public sector. The focus on governance was the World Bank’s answer to this dilemma as articulated in its 1992 paper ‘Governance and Development’, and this response set the scene for a new orthodoxy in development thinking.

One of the most important theoretical points implied by structural adjustment was the positive correlation between civil society action and good governance outcomes. It was advocated that the private sector and civil society organisations could make a more significant contribution to development than the state bureaucracy on its own (Jeffries, 1993). Therefore, it was decided that governance reform would be directed at freeing up state-controlled resources that could be better used and managed by other institutions. The overarching goal was to equip these institutions, and through them, the country as a whole, with the tools and capacity to manage their own development process and to ultimately become self-reliant. Officially, the Bank had a bureaucratic, rather than a political, agenda following on from the 1980s New Public Management (NPM) strategy of administrative simplification based on disaggregation, competition and an entrepreneurial culture (Corbridge et al., 2005; Hyden and Court, 2002). Good governance aimed to further improve the bureaucratic competence and accountability of the public sector through a strategy that emphasised the need for an open and integrated public service (Dunleavy et al., 2005; Manning, 2001).

By the 1990s, this largely administrative governance agenda was extended to a political mandate although under the guise of terms such as ‘institutional change’ and ‘good governance’ (Hewitt de Alcantara, 1998; Moore, 2006). This new orthodoxy of the international development community, most notably international financial institutions and bilateral donors, challenged conventional notions of state sovereignty by threatening to withhold aid to countries that limited freedom of expression and association unless they could show commitment to altering their prevailing political set-up. Facilitated by the end of the Cold War, this led to a particular concern for multi-party politics and democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa and ex-USSR nations. In Latin America and South Asia, while some funding was tied to ideological considerations such as womens’ right, attention became focused more on the institutions of democracy and on the need to strengthen civic associations (Hewitt de Alcantara, 1998). Along with policies that were put forward to privatise or at least regulate some parts of the economy, measures were proposed to transfer some of the powers of the central government to local government institutions and NGOs.

Democracy came to be seen as the route to development because it was assumed to provide a more conducive environment for market-led economic development carrying the potential for a more efficient, accountable and hence less corrupt government (Moore, 2006). During the modernisation era, evidence had accumulated to suggest an associated trajectory between economic development and democracy both in developed and developing countries. According to this, democracy was perceived a function of economic development, not a prerequisite of it (Cutright, 1963; Lipset, 1960).

Evidence shows us that impressive reductions in poverty around the world are largely attributable to economic growth subject to the important caveat that a country’s initial depth of poverty and degree of inequality significantly affect the pace of poverty reduction through growth (OECD 2011).

There is also broad support for the proposition that good governance is necessary for sustainable development. Heads of state and government from around the world pledged in the Millennium Declaration to promote human rights, democracy, and good governance. They boldly declared at the 2005 World Summit that “good governance and the rule of law are essential for sustained economic growth, sustainable development and the eradication of poverty and hunger.” (United Nations Millennium Declaration,” September 8, 2000) This sentiment was echoed in the 2011 Framework for the OECD Strategy on Development: “Effective governance is a necessary condition for economic prosperity and social cohesion.” (OECD 2011)

2.6 AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE IN THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD

The post-independent African states has undergone several political and economic reforms yet there is little development to show for it. Africa by far, one of the richest continents endowed with natural and mineral resources in the world, but among the poorest in the world. The following are some of the major post-independence development challenges in Africa.

Bribery and Corruption

According to Kraus (2007), corruption is worse than prostitution. The latter might endanger the morals of an individual; the former invariably endangers the morals of an entire country (Kraus, 2007). One of the biggest challenges of contemporary world is corruption. The term has a multi-faceted phenomenon and the concept contains too many connotations, thus difficult to define. Over the past two decades, there has been substantial amount of theories and empirical research on a wide array of explanation, types, and solutions to corruption. It is therefore important to note that, corruption exist everywhere but mostly entrenched in developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.

Corruption is a disease, a cancer that eats into the cultural, political and economic fabric of society, and destroys the functioning of vital organs. In the words of Transparency International, “Corruption is one of the greatest challenges of the contemporary world. It undermines good government, fundamentally distorts public policy, leads to the misallocation of resources, harms the private sector and private sector development and particularly hurts the poor” (Amundsen, 1999:1; Transparency International). This cancer (corruption) retards development efforts, hinders administrative development in the bureaucracy and undermines political institutions by weakening the legitimacy of accountability of governments. According to Nduku (2014), corruption affects the proper running of governments, distorts the correct functioning of economic and political institutions and hampers transparency, exploits the human person for selfish interests, renders respect for rules obsolete and is a manifestation of structural sin. It is worthwhile to confront this disease more so in the public sectors.

In a bid to defined corruption and bribery for conceptual clarification, one could say that the two concept are too close to call. Corruption is conventionally understood, and referred to, as the private wealth-seeking behavior of someone who represents the state and the public authority, or as the misuse of public goods by public officials for private ends. The working definition of the World Bank is that, corruption is the abuse of public power for private benefit (Amundsen, 1999:2). The classical and most widely used definition of corruption is “behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence” (Amundsen, 1999:3). The bribery is the payment (in money or kind) given to or taken by the state official in a corrupt relationship. In both concepts, one could say that there is a state—society relationship. The paper acknowledged that there are various type of corruption ranging from political, economic, judicial etc, however, this paper advances the opinion that political corruption is the most rampant in Africa. Political corruption is one the issues that African governments are facing and it has retarded growth in many African nations. Corruption is injustice and a threat to sustainable development. Political corruption is any transaction between private and public sector actors through which collective goods are illegitimately converted into private-regarding payoffs (Heidenheimer et. al.1993:6). Corruption is a failure of governance and also an instrument used by African tyrants and dictators to enrich and over stayed in power. Political corruption has not only undermined bureaucratic institutions in Africa but also administrative and economic development. For example, “since independence in 1960 to 2010, Nigeria has reportedly lost $500 billion” to corruption (Adeola, 2015, Sahara News). Again, the ex-petroleum minister of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, between 2010 and 2015 Mrs. Alison-Madueke was involved in a bribery and money laundering scandal. It was alleged that $20 billion of oil money had gone missing when she was in office. The argument of this paper is that, corruption is one of the causes of Africa’s underdevelopment. There has been reports of substantial cases of embezzlement of public funds and capital flight by some African president and politician alike.

Governance Issues

The term “Good Governance” has been a buzzword capturing the attention of development experts and international community at large. In Africa, the governance debate came from the observation that structural adjustment polices/programs (SAPs) had not led to the expected economic growth. In 1989 report, the World Bank identified governance as the main cause of Africa’s sustained economic crisis and pointed to corruption, nepotism, and bad policies as the factors that hampered development (Mudacumura & Morçöl 2014; A.M Kjaer 2014:20). The structural adjustment programs in Africa were woeful partly due to leadership challenges coupled with high rate of bureaucratic corruption. The high rate of corruption is a manifestation of institutional deficiencies in Africa. Again, the other explanation why the prescription of economic policy reforms had failed to cure the patient (Africa), the World Bank report pointed to “bad governance” in terms of corruption, inefficiency, and lack of accountability as the problem (World Bank, 1989: 60). To quote the Bank:

“Underlying the litany of Africa’s development problems is a crisis of good governance. By governance is meant the exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs. Because countervailing power has been lacking, state officials in many countries have served their own interest without fear of being called to account. In self-defense, individuals have built up personal networks of influence rather than hold the allpowerful state accountable for its systemic failure. In this way, politics becomes personalized and patronage becomes essential to maintain power. The leadership assumes broad discretionary authority and loses its legitimacy, information is controlled, and voluntary associations are co-opted or disbanded. The environment cannot readily support a dynamic economy (World Bank, 1989: 60-61)”.

The governance debate has been evolving for the past two decades in to the traditional view of governance, which focuses on state power steering the affairs of the government and the new governance concept which emphasize on network and partnership with stakeholder to initiate workable policy and making decision for societal good. The United Nations, Commonwealth, and some other non-state actors has begun to incorporated democracy, human rights, and governance in their programs and activities. Africa’s development would not be sustainable without strong and committed political leadership, and accountability mechanism to fight against bureaucratic corruption. The manifestation of civil unrest, long rule of dictators, corruption, undemocratic election, and monopolies media, were the root causes of bad governance in Africa.

Weak Leadership and Ineffective Political Institutions

For the past four decades, the crisis of leadership has bedeviled Africa due to unclear ideology, frequent changes of government, and civil wars. The issue of leadership had and has been the greatest challenge Africa is facing in the 21st century. Political commitment is lacking in Africa, and the leader’s inability to understand the responsibilities and challenges that comes with governing developing society. As Afegbua and Adejuwon (2012) noted, leadership is one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth. The aforementioned claim is a clear evident in Africa where people rise to power without understanding of what governance is all about and hence leads to failed and autocratic leaders in Africa. The staggering wave of violence, insecurity, increasing crime wave, economic recession, coupled with the break in law and order are the attributes to the problem of leadership and governance in Africa. Therefore, the quest for good leadership is a sine-qua-non for governance and sustainable development (Afegbua and Adejuwon, 2012:141-2). The point to note here is that, good leadership is indispensable for governance and sustainable growth. In other words, they complement each other and one cannot be achieved without the other. Thus, it would be safe to say that there is a nexus between political leadership and sustainable growth.

The World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and development donors has recognized that Africa’s inability to meet its development huddles are partly due to weak leadership and poor institutional structures to hold political officials accountable for their actions. The numerous problems which have been bedeviling African states vis-à-vis ethnic and communal clashes, increasing crime wave, drug trafficking, advanced fee fraud etc, have been blamed on ineffective leadership (Afegbua and Adejuwon, 2012:142). The Rwandan genocide, civil wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia etc, is a clear testimony of the aforementioned claim. As a result of leadership woes, abject poverty, corruption, civil wars, etc, Africa is being describe as the ‘dark continent’.

Another predicament of the continent of Africa is poor institutional structures which is often blame on bureaucracy. The principle of checks and balance remains an abstract idea which left leaders to treat their nations as their own property. This has further weakened bureaucratic institutions for proper accountability and hence massive corruption at top level.

Bureaucracy is blame for Africa’s institutional weaknesses. Bureaucracy has been largely criticized throughout much organization theory and management literature, having been seen as inefficient and incapable of being able to respond to external changes. Instead, a variety of more fluid and flexible organization forms, capable of responding to new challenges and new human demands and expectations are advocated. Bureaucracy is, for its detractors, one of the predicaments of modern life and must be examined as what is, at best, a functional solution to administrative problems and, at worst, an immediate and living threat to the open society. As Gormley and Balla (2013) noted, contemporary government addresses issues that are not only wide ranging but often complex. Bureaucracies are also valuable to government actors pursuing specific, self-interested goals (Gormley & Balla, 2013:76-7). “Bureaucracy is a term so loaded with negative meaning for most people that, it is mainly used as a negative rhetorical resource and it is difficult to make an explicit ideological case for bureaucracy” (Thompson and Alvesson, 2005: 105). Bureaucracy has many detractors and few friends. Bureaucratic institutions in Africa are used as scapegoat for administrative challenges the continent is facing. A number of authors criticized and exaggerate the problems and do not acknowledge that governments and organizations are capable of working quite well (Goodsell, 2004:19). This paper advances the opinion that, the problem is not bureaucracy per se, but rather the institutions within which bureaucracy operates is the problem. However, Africa needs institutional and bureaucratic reforms to attain sustainable development.

Democracy and Democratic Principles

One of the daunting challenge of contemporary African states is democracy. Many see it as a foreign concept that contradicts the African traditional beliefs and principles. However, this claims are baseless and politically motivated. It has been empirically proven that significant improvement in democracy would lead to socio-economic development. The developed countries such as America, England, and France etc, is a clear testimony of the above stated claim. Democracy has expanded over the past few decades with challenges and misconceptions. As Larry Diamond (2005,b) observed in the opening statement of his report on Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States: Lessons and Challenges that, ‘as the number of democracies has increased—from about 40 in 1974 to around 120 today (slightly over 60 percent of all independent states)—the task of promoting democratic transitions and consolidation has become more difficult, because the countries with the economic, social, historical and geographic conditions most conducive to democracy have already installed (and in many cases, largely consolidated) democracy’ (Diamond,2005 b:1). Here, it is vital to note that democracy has a greater tendency to succeed in countries where the economic, political, and social conditions are favorable. Democratic principles such as rule of law, freedom of speech, human rights, periodic free and fair elections etc, are key elements for Africa in meeting its contemporary development challenges.

2.7 THE GOOD GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT AGENDA IN AFRICA

The World Bank, IMF, and other international development donors view Africa’s inability to attain high level development partly due to it records of bad governance. Good governance is a means to achieve socio-economic development especially in Africa where there is high influx of foreign aid with little result to show for it. The World Bank indicators of good governance encompassing democracy, transparency and accountability, it may be said that, the whole idea of good governance is that of a participative system in which those who are called upon to govern on behalf of the people are motivated with a will to giving their best, serving and doing good to the people, solving their problems and making their lives more liveable, satisfying and enjoyable (Subbarao & Kumar, 2015:89). Governance is development oriented and aims at improving the living standard of people.

According to the APRM themes, Good economic governance, including transparency in financial management, is an essential pre-requisite for promoting economic growth and reducing poverty. Mindful of this, there are five key objectives pursued: Promote macroeconomic policies that support sustainable development, Implement transparent, predictable and credible government economic policies, Promote sound public finance management, Fight corruption and money laundering, Accelerate regional integration by participating in the harmonization of monetary, trade and investment policies amongst the participating states.

NEPAD outlined the following as the agenda for Africa development upon which are achievable based on good governance:

1. Uplift the welfare of Africans and strengthen effectiveness and capability of institutions
2. Build Healthy National and Regional Food Systems and Culture and Empower Rural Communities
3. Facilitate access to affordable and sustainable energy
4. Promote Climate Resilience, Environmental Protection and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources
5. Advance African economies scientifically and technologically, intensify generation and application of knowledge and innovation