ELECTORAL MALPRACTICE AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN NIGERIA.A STUDY OF FOURTH REPUBLIC

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Our focus in this chapter is to critically examine relevant literature that would assist in explaining the research problem and furthermore recognize the efforts of scholars who had previously contributed immensely to similar research. The chapter intends to deepen the understanding of the study and close the perceived gaps.

2.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

ELECTION

Election, the formal process of selecting a person for public office or of accepting or rejecting a political proposition by voting. It is important to distinguish between the form and the substance of elections. In some cases, electoral forms are present but the substance of an election is missing, as when voters do not have a free and genuine choice between at least two alternatives. Most countries hold elections in at least the formal sense, but in many of them the elections are not competitive (e.g., all but one party may be forbidden to contest) or the electoral situation is in other respects highly compromised.

In a democracy, elections serve as an important mechanism and viable means that ensure orderliness in the process of leadership succession and change. It gives legitimacy and political authority to every administration. Elections play dominant roles in a democracy and these roles are hugely circumscribed in terms of portraying the popular will, inculcating political changes and actualization of regimes legitimacy. Schumpeter (1947) notes that democracy ensures that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusingthe men who are to rule them, this means that democracy is all about conducting elections and choosing political leaders. Elections ensure how popular a government is and it reveals the social pact that exist between the govern and the governed and this illustrates the basis of political authority, legitimacy and citizens’ obligations. It also helps to shape and sharpened political accountability between the governors and governed via reciprocity and exchange. As Sandbrook (1988) posit: Elections and the struggle for power are essential because it gives the oppressed classes the chance to put the question of alternative ideologies on the agenda and therefore constitute an important stage in the socialist quest to extend democratic control to the social and economic as well as political sphere. However, for elections to thrive there should be the establishment of a well defined, competent, relatively independent and non-partisan electoral body that will be responsible for the conduct of elections. There is need for the existence of impartial judiciary that will interpret electoral laws and as well as adjudicate on electoral matters. Mass media devoid of influence from the politicians should be instituted together with police force that will help supervise the conduct of an election. Jinadu, (1995) and Adejumobi, (1997) concur that: There should be electoral laws guiding the conduct of an election, organization of political parties, voters’ registration, nomination of candidates for elective public office, balloting , ballot-counting and the declaration of election results as this will give credence to the success of elections.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR CONDUCT OF ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA

Elections are an important aspect of liberal democracy. As stated above, the integrity and credibility of elections are strong measures of a deepened democracy in a country. In every country where democracy thrives, stringent laws exist to guide the conduct of polls. However, because it is through elections that people decide who occupies particular elective public offices, politicians and groups sometimes resort to the use of vile unscrupulous methods to win elections. Therefore, it behoves any political entity to put in place rules and regulations that all stakeholders in the electoral process must obey. These regulations also spell out the punishment to be meted out to any ailing individual and group that engages in electoral malpractice. In Nigeria, the legal framework that defines how elections in the country are conducted, what constitutes electoral offences, and how offenders are punished is found in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and the Electoral Act 2010, as amended.

The 1999 Constitution deals mainly with the structures necessary for the conduct of elections for the various political offices in Nigeria and the constitution of the electoral body, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) as well as Election Tribunals. By contrast, the Electoral Act 2010 contains detailed definitions of electoral malpractices and the punishment accrued to them. For example, the 1999 Constitution in sections 76, 77 and 78 provides the modalities for electing members of the National Assembly and the qualifications of Nigerians who can vote during National Assembly elections. Similarly, sections 116, 117 and 118 of the Constitution contain information on how and when elections for State Houses of Assembly are to be conducted. Furthermore, as it affects the office of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, sections 131, 132, 133 and 134 of the 1999 Constitution specify the qualities of any Nigerian who wishes to contest in a presidential election, and how he or she will emerge as a president-elect in a national poll. Specifications are also stipulated for candidates seeking elections to office as State Governor in sections 177, 178 and 179. In order to resolve disputes arising from elections for the above offices, section 285 of the 1999 Constitution makes provision for the establishment of Election Tribunals at the state and federal levels to handle such disputes. In the Third Schedule, Part I, sections 14 and 15 of the Constitution provide for the establishment of INEC, the qualities of its chairman, and its functions and powers.

With regard to electoral offences, the Electoral Act 2010 clearly states offences and punishments for buying or selling voters’ cards, as well as crimes committed during registration of voters. For instance, section 23(c) of the Act states that anyone who ‘buys or offers to buy voters’ card on his own behalf or on behalf of any other person, commits an offence and should be liable, on conviction, to a fine not exceeding N500,000.00 or imprisonment not exceeding two years or both’. As it affects registration of voters, section 24(2b) provides that anyone who ‘in any way hinders another person from registering as a voter commits an offence and is liable on conviction, to a fine not exceeding N500,000.00 or imprisonment not exceeding 5 years’. Other electoral offences covered by the Electoral Act 2010 include impersonation and voting when not qualified to do so (section 122), bribery and conspiracy (section 124), non-secrecy in voting (section 125), voting by unregistered persons (section 127), disorderly conduct at elections (section 128), offences on election day (section 129), undue influence (section 130), threatening other voters (section 131) and so on. All these legal provisions are meant to forestall incidents of electoral malpractice in order to enhance the credibility and integrity of elections in Nigeria. However, as discussed next, such fraudulent acts are still prevalent in Nigeria’s electoral process.

ELECTORAL MALPRACTICE

Electoral malpractice generally refers to an instance where acceptable norms and principles that confer credibility on elections are desecrated; and in their place duplicity, falsehood, manipulation and cheating by any means are deployed to sway the outcome of elections. Ezeani (2005) defines electoral malpractice as ‘illegalities committed by government, officials responsible for the conduct of elections, political parties, groups or individuals with sinister intention to influence an election in favour of a candidate(s)’ (Ezeani 2005, p. 415). Birch (2011) divides electoral malpractices – which she calls ‘electoral corruption’ – into three categories. They are malpractices that relate to the legal framework, malpractice related to preference formation, and malpractices centred on electoral administration. Electoral malpractice in any form is anathema to democracy because of its retrogressive effect on the quality of democracy in a country. As a corollary, electoral malpractices are not condoned anywhere in the world but rather censured. Abhorrence of electoral malpractice is necessary. If malpractices such as winning elections through rigging, massive use of money, use of violence against political adversaries and so on are unbridled, the tendency is for a negative culture of ‘political larceny’ to be inculcated by politicians. This ultimately dilutes the potency of elections as a means of peaceful transfer of political power and as a tool to legitimise political power.

NATURE OF ELECTORAL MALPRACTICE

There are two basic approaches have been designed by scholars seeking to define and categorize practices that undermine electoral process, these are inclusive and restrictive (Vickery and Shein, 2012). They espoused inclusive (fraud, malpractice and manipulation) to be as broad as possible, no matter the imprecision. Some writers in this category situate their definitions normatively, finding that electoral wrongdoing violates domestic norms or internationally accepted standards for free and fair elections. Restrictive approach focus only or mostly on the provisions of the law (i.e. fraud can be identified by whether it violates existing domestic legal provisions). This enables a context-specific approach to combating various kinds of electoral wrongdoing, and it makes obvious sense for the election management body to use a country’s domestic laws as benchmarks in its fraud or malpractice control activities. There are three types of electoral malpractices, pre-election, election period and post-election period (Birch, 2009; Norris, 2012; Olawole et al., 2013; Ugwuja, 2015). The manipulation of rules, the manipulation of voters and the manipulation of voting. By manipulation of rules, electoral laws are distorted so as to favor one party or contestant in an election. For example, when the rules administering candidacy prevent certain political forces from contesting elections, or when large sectors of the adult population are excluded from voting. The manipulation of voters is either to distort voters preferences or to sway preference expression. The first one involves illicit forms of campaign tactics that are deceptive and that violate campaign finance laws or severe bias in media coverage of the election. The second form consist of alteration of how preferences are expressed at the polling station, through vote-buying or intimidation in the aim of increasing the vote of a specific political force. Voting manipulation consist of electoral maladministration, such as ballot-box stuffing, misreporting, under-provision of voting facilities in opposition strongholds, lack of transparency in the organization of the election, bias in the way electoral disputes are adjudicated in the courts, and so on (Birch, 2009). The right to vote is a civic responsibility or public function conferred upon the citizen for reason of social expediency (Olawole et al., 2013). There is strong relationship in Africa’s electoral malpractices with the type and forms of historical system practiced by each society, coupled with the class structure, social stratification, aestheticism and religious differences. Thus conclude that until elections become completely competitive and the electorates are free to make a choice between alternatives and that a liberal political system is put in place, there will always be electoral malpractice (Birch, 2009). In Africa, the scenario is a curse to the electorate and a gimmick played by politicians who seek to legitimize the illegitimate practice of coercing citizens into voting for them on the backdrop of rampant electoral rigging (Mapuva, 2013).

DEMOCRACY

Democracy is a concept that receives tremendous attention from political scientists and other scholars. Numerous attempts have been made to define the concept, with a resulting plethora of definitions of democracy. What is evident in most of the definitions is an apparent shift away from the classic popularised definition of the concept by Abraham Lincoln (16th American President, 1861–1865), who stated that democracy is ‘government of the people, by the people, for the people’. More modern definitions conceive of democracy being based on specific variables or factors. Some scholars view democracy as political competition through periodic elections, others see it as citizen participation, and still others link democracy to civil and political liberties. Addi (1997, p. 107) perceives democracy as ‘the process by which power changes hands without violence or force’. The focus of Addi’s definition is the peaceful transfer of political power in a society. Similarly, according to Morlino (2004, p. 5) the concept of democracy implies ‘a regime has at least universal adult suffrage; recurring, free, competitive and fair elections; more than one political party; and more than one source of information’. Morlino stipulates the existence of democratic institutions and rights in a polity to attenuate its being qualified as a democracy.

Aristotle’s view on democracy was that the most pure democracy is that which is so called principally from that equality which prevails in it; for this is what the state directs; that the poor shall not be in greater subjection than the rich; nor that the supreme power shall be lodged in either of these, but that both shall share it.

Aristotle’s emphasis on the meaning of democracy as equality of all individuals in a society is corroborated by the work of Kapstein and Converse (2008), in which they attribute the causes of breakdown of democracy in a country. According to these authors, democracy as a mode of government has thrived in some countries but failed in other countries because of the prevalence of poverty and inequality that instil segregation in society.

Arising from these varied conceptions of democracy, when it is practised in consonance with its precepts, democracy provides a political platform through elections for the engagement of all members of a community in the process that determines who governs them. Thus, political power belongs to the people and not to the elected leaders. People may easily ‘dethrone’ a leader if he or she does not perform.

DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

Democratic consolidation is construed as a stage in a country’s democratic process where democracy acquires some characteristics of stability. Consolidation cannot take place unless certain political features are present in a country operating a democratic regime. Some of these features have been identified as ‘routinized, recurrent and predictable patterns of political behaviour... ; defining clear workable rules of the game, establishing more authoritative, proficient, and dependable structures for mediating political conflicts … ’ (Diamond 1999, p. 75). In addition, for a democracy to consolidate, the predisposition to authoritarian reversal should be remote. The military – as an alternate domain of the exercise of political power – should exhibit total loyalty to democratic institutions, thus forestalling the possibility or threat of overthrowing an elected government. Most importantly, democratic consolidation becomes overt in a society when the rights of citizens are guaranteed, and the ruling elite is accountable and responsive to the populace. A further hallmark of democratic consolidation is that the masses are well acquainted with political procedures and norms – that is, the masses ‘routinize, internalize, habituate, and legitimate’ (Im 2000, p. 23) these norms and procedures.

Democratic consolidation thus incorporates vast criss-crossing or variegated governance issues that border on people-centred government, and responsive political leadership that is absolutely accountable to the electorate. It also implies permanence of the regime. This is not to say that consolidated democracies are immune against political squabbles. Even in old and stable democracies, instability resulting from political upheavals – which in turn result from dwindling economic fortunes – can culminate in social distortions. This pattern can be seen in recent anti-austerity demonstrations in Europe in 2011 and 2012 which were the result of the global economic recession that began in 2008.

Linz and Stephen (1997, p. 23) outline two impediments to democratic consolidation. These are the threat of ethnic conflicts in multi-ethnic states, and the disenchantment by citizenry which arises from the inability of democratic regimes to deliver democratic dividends to improve the living conditions of the masses. This is precisely the case in the ‘third wave’ democracies, especially those that evolved in the 1990s in Africa – including Nigeria. In these countries, there has been growing disenchantment of the citizenry because of worsening social conditions of the people after more than a decade of the start of democracy. Democratic consolidation therefore means much more than mere existence of institutions and periodic elections.

The concern of democratic consolidation is about strengthening or otherwise of political institutions such as political parties, legislature and electoral umpires. It deals with governmental administration in relation with accountability, transparency, constitutionalism, rule of law and bureaucracy. It encompasses the understanding of the acceptance and obedience of formal and informal institutions of democracy (Khorram-Manesh, 2013). However, the most reviewed notions regarding democratic consolidation is that when is democracy “consolidated”, when it is likely to endure and expected to “last well into the future” (Schedler, 1997; O’Donnell, 1996; Valenzuela, 1990). The most significant issue associated with democratic consolidation is transition from authoritarian regimes to democratic regimes (O’Donnell, 1996). The main focus is centered on how really democratic the post-transition political institutions are and on their long-term prospects, i.e. whether they are prone to succumb to a new round of authoritarian rule or whether they will prove to be stable or consolidated (Valenzuela, 1990). Therefore the process of achieving democratic consolidation involves scrapping the institutions, procedures, and expectations that are ambiguous with the minimal workings of a democratic regime, so that the new ones that are “created or recreated with the transition to a democratic government to develop further.” Democratic consolidation consists narrowing of democratic uncertainties through normalization of behavioral and institutional changes. The normalization requires the expansion of citizen access, development of democratic citizenship and culture, broadening of leadership recruitment and training, and other functions that civil society performs. But, most of all, and most urgently, it requires political institutionalization (Matlosa, 2008). Thus democracy is consolidated whenever political and economic situations of a particular system of institutions become the only game in town, when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions, when all losers (of political contest) want to try again within the same institution under which they have just lost (O'Donnell, 1996). It is argued that a democracy is consolidated when power is alternated between rival parties, support for system is continued during time of economic hardship, rebels are defeated and punished, the regime remain stable in the face of restructuring of the party system, and there exists no significant anti-system (Okoye et al., 2012).

OVERVIEW OF ELECTORAL MALPRACTICE IN NIGERIA SINCE 1999

Since the re-emergence of democracy in Nigeria in the Fourth Republic, the country has conducted five nationwide elections (in 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015). These elections have shared many common features and few things differentiate them. For instance, the elections were all conducted periodically as expected, they were closely monitored by domestic and international observers, they arouse varied contestations from Nigerian politicians and voters, and they were all marred by varying degrees and calibres of malpractice. Apart from the 2011 and 2015 polls, the credibility and acceptability of the elections waned further with each subsequent election. The inference from the conduct and outcome of these elections is that Nigeria is yet to demonstrate the attributes of a growing democracy (Yagboyaju 2011, p. 93). This section summarises the elections in Nigeria by highlighting their general characteristics, the nature of malpractices, and an assessment of how each election differed from the others in terms of acceptability and credibility.

After a long period of over three decades of military rule, elections that ushered in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic were organised in a staggered manner. The Governorship and state Houses of Assembly elections were held on 9 January 1999. The National Assembly elections followed on 20 February, and the Presidential election was conducted on 27 February 1999. This marked the end of the transition programme of the military regime led by General Abdusalami Abubakar. The 1999 elections were won by Olusegun Obasanjo of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), and he was subsequently (on 29 May 1999) sworn in as Nigeria’s first president in the Fourth Republic.

As noted by Okolie (2005, p. 439), ‘transition elections’ are usually relatively peaceful because a country is transitioning from an authoritarian to a civil regime. This was true of the 1999 elections, which ‘took place without systematic rigging’ (Omotosho 2008, p. 3). Nigerians were generally fed up with military dictatorship and ready to embrace a democratic order, and the 1999 polls gave them the opportunity to attain this aspiration. This is not to say that the 1999 general elections were devoid of electoral corruption or malpractices or that malpractice was confined to known past electoral irregularities. Such fraudulent electoral practices included the late commencement of polling, late arrival of electoral materials, missing names of eligible voters on the register, early closure of voting at some polling stations and voting during legally unstipulated hours. The most noticeable were cases of bribing of voters and vote buying, as reported by election observers. For instance, in Oshimili North LGA in Delta State, a party gave out the money that facilitated the sharing of ballot papers among the parties, and as a result, that party had 75% to thumb print, while the other two parties shared the remaining ballot papers. In another instance of vote buying,

In Kano, malpractices were on all sides. While in Gaya Local Government Area (LGA) some voters were offering their votes for sale for as little as N10.00, in other areas, such as Madobi, the INEC officials and party agents connived in bribery and rigging. The fallout of bribery at Sabon Gari ward, Magami polling station in Zamfara State…. Attempts at underage voting were also a feature in this state, for example, at Dambawa 5B polling stations in Tsafe Ward, ten underage boys were brought for voting, but were detected.

What set the 1999 elections apart from subsequent elections was the subtleness of the nature, magnitude and sophistication in the mode of electoral malpractices. For instance, deadly malpractice such as physical violence during and after an election (resulting in high casualty levels) was less noticeable.

The General Election of 1999

The 1999 general election came up with three political parties; Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), All Peoples Party (APP) and the Alliance for Democracy (AD). APP and AD came into alliance and fronted Chief Olu Falae who competed with PDP flag bearer, former military Head of state, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo who later won the election. Before this election, the military has promised lots of transition but ended up transferring power from one military regime to the other. In fact, the polity had been damaged that people no longer show interest in politics due to three decades of military dictatorship and the people of South-west (Yoruba) extraction were not happy that their son (Abiola) was denied the chance to rule the country in an election conducted in June 12, 1993 which he won with great margin. They saw it as a device from the federal government to stop a Yoruba man from ruling the country. The outgoing military who wanted to settle the above scores, released Obasanjo who was then in detention for an alleged attempted coup and presented him as the sole flag bearer of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). Obasanjo, who also come from Yoruba, did not attract support from his people because he was picked by the military to run for the election. This made his people accused him of representing the interest of the military oligarchy. The South-west rather rallied support for Olu Falae but Obasanjo later emerged the winner in an election that was seen as a mirage and as a result was not taken serious. The lackadaisical attitude shown towards the elections by Nigerians gave the military junta the free hand to manipulate the election and handed power to the person the hierarchy wanted.

The General Election of 2003

The 2003 election brought some fresh hope to Nigerians because the previous election handed over power from military regime to a civilian regime. Because Nigerians were in desperate need for a democratic consolidation and haven assured by the military that power would be relinquished to a civil administration, the game this time, took a different look in that many were desperate for a political power having seen the kind of money that accrue from politics. This quest for money prompted the incumbents to clinch onto power for more tenure. Though Aina (2006) states that elections were adjudged as greatly flawed by the International observers, it presented in the history of Nigeria politics the first peaceful civilian transition in Nigeria. However, the election was not without rigging judging from the reports gathered. European Commission which observers rampant election-related malpractice in a number of states in the Middle Belt, the South East and the South –South (European Commission, 2003:42).A Commonwealth Election Observer, Stuart Mole who was an eye witness in the Niger-Delta reveals that the election outcomes were fixed. He notes that while voter turnout for the April 2003 elections was very low in many polling stations, with some polling booths not opening till 2.00 p.m. and closing before 5.00p.m., the election results declared for most constituencies indicated a 90-100 percent voter turn-out (Mole, 2003). Added to this,The next election in Nigeria after 1999 was held on 12 and 19 April and 3 May 2003 for the National Assembly, Presidency and governorship State Assemblies respectively. The 2003 elections were the litmus test for Nigeria’s democracy. The 1999 elections had been conducted by the military, whereas the 2003 election was the first to be held by a civilian government. The 2003 polls led to the first successful inter-civilian transfer of power in Nigeria since a botched attempt at civilian–civilian power transition in 1983 amidst a military coup. However, the 2003 election, like its predecessors, was bedevilled by similar electoral ills to those that had previously occurred in Nigeria. The visible malpractices during the 2003 elections included massive use of money for vote buying, stuffing of ballot boxes, ballot-box snatching, falsifying election results to favour or disfavour particular candidates, and fraudulently announcing that candidates who had in fact lost, had won (Ojo 2008, p. 116). European Union (EU) observers of the elections noted that

though the ballot box was full by around midday, only 85 names on the list of 743 registered voters were ticked [on the register]. At a third polling station, 50 cast ballots were suspiciously folded in the same way, and the first 50 names on the voter list were ticked [on the register] in alphabetical order.

The degree of electoral corruption displayed in the 2003 polls gave the impression that there was a deliberate attempt by the ruling PDP to retain power at all costs and by any means. Indeed, according to Elaigwu (2006), the 2003 elections were very fraudulent and were so acknowledged by both domestic as well as foreign observers and monitors. It is therefore not surprising that three years after, some petitions are just being sorted out by the electoral tribunals and Appeal Courts. …All political parties in power at the state level put their rigging machines on overdrive and ended up with overkill. The [elections] were disastrous – they were demonstrable evidences of democratic deficit, which has the potential for endangering the democratic process.

The clamour by opposition parties for the cancellation of the elections had little effect, and President Olusegun Obasanjo was sworn in on 29 May 2003 for a second term. Most extraordinary of all, this apparently phantom election recorded extraordinary high turnout figures generally in excess of 90 percent. In Tai district, where we had seen few voters and where the polls had only opened for a few hours, turnout was recorded at an incredible 99.6 percent (and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) share of the vote at 99.2 percent). Clearly, widespread voter intimidation had accompanied massive electoral fraud.(ibid). Ogunsanwo (2003:15) remarked on the conduct of the 2003 elections, one thing was unique in the 2003 election. The Independent National Electoral Commission was genuinely not in control. Human Rights Watch which monitored the election and asserted that: Rigging, violence and intimidation were so pervasive and on such naked display that they made a mockery of the electoral process. Where voting did not take place, many voters stayed away from the polls. They were frightened off by a pre-election period that saw more than 100 people killed in election related clashes. By the time election ended, the body count has surpassed 300 (Human Rights Watch, 2003). In his speech, Iyayi (2007) noted that Transition Monitoring Group described 2003 election thus: “ ….Twenty-nine of the registered political parties that either contested or did not contest the elections have variously rejected the results as announced by the INEC (Independent National Electoral Commission) declaring the results a fraudulent. Some political parties and their candidates decided to challenge some of the results before the various Election petition tribunals and have gone ahead to do while others declared “mass action” to pressure a government without popular candidate to quit power. Abubarkar Momoh describing the latest Nigeria democracy crippled with rigged elections and other forms of manipulations, dubbed it “presidential Authoritarianism”. In his words: It is questionable whether what we had in 1999 and 2003 could be rightly qualified as election and not selections or better still allocation of positions. The( ruling ) Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) using the (so called) Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the Nigerian Police to (sic) share out votes to contestants. Party primaries were mere impositions of godfather’s candidates. And they were then allocated votes by INEC (Momoh, 2005.51).

The General Election of 2007

The 2007 election marked the first time when a third consecutive presidential election took place and the first time when one elected leader succeeded another in the history of Nigeria’s election. Amidst the tension that engulfed the country via delay in reviewing the constitution to give real autonomy to the electoral commission by the National Assembly, Obasanjo and his vice Atiku accusing each other of corruption, agitation for more tenures from the southern politicians while northern politicians insist that power must move back to their region, or the persistent disturbance from the Niger Delta militants to control some oil wells located in their states. Many political parties registered, the struggle for who should control the government gained momentum and this gave room for various presidential aspirants with the motives of perpetrating all forms of maneuvers to dethrone the leadership of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP).President Obasanjo who failed in his bid for third term tenure, handpicked his successor (late president Umaru Musa Yar Adua) in a PDP convention and left other aspirants vying for the same seat disappointed. Earlier on, some PDP members who had intention to vie decamped to some other political parties and this made the election even fierce as killing of political opponents mount. This of course did not stop without election rigging since it was a carryover of the 2003 election which employed all kinds of riggings. 2007 election was not far from previous elections conducted in Nigeria. This time around, the election rigging went scientific as the Electoral bodies made electronic voting their benchmark. In spite of the promise from INEC chairman that the election will be free and fair, local and international monitoring team categorized the election a rigged one , in fact, as the most damning kind of election ever conducted anywhere in the world. In his speech, Iyayi (2007) notes: The April 2007 general elections surpassed the 2003 and 2004 elections in the level of fraud, violence, rigging, criminality and complicity by the various organs of the state in the electoral farce that occurred. Human Right Watch reported that ‘in several key states, the Nigerian government failed completely in its obligation to conduct free and fair elections’. The 59 member International Republican Institute concluded that the first three parts of Nigeria’s April 14 and April 21 election process fall below the standard set by previous Nigeria elections and international elections’. The remaining part of the election process was the determination of election disputes in the election tribunals and the courts. The challenges from some of the election outcomes have seen some been upturned while fresh elections were declared in some states like; Ekiti, Edo, Oyo, Benue and among others. Recently, one of the leading newspapers in Nigeria, The Nation, reported through Adekunle Jimoh in 15th October, 2010 that a governorship aspirant (Dr. Kayode Fayemi) who contested in 2007 was returned as the governor of Ekiti State having been rigged out in a re-election he won with 105,631 votes against Olusegun Oni’s 95,176, who maneuvered the contest via election rigging and this also affect many other states with cases of election riggings.

On 14 and 21 April 2007, Nigerians went to the poll to elect another set of leaders. However, the 2007 general elections turned out to be the most disparaged and discredited of the lot. They were dubbed the worst ever held in any part of the world and in Nigeria’s electoral history, in terms of the high level of fraudulent practices (Jega 2009, p. 20). This debasement has led scholars to describe the 2007 elections as a ‘fitful path’ to democracy (Ibrahim 2007), ‘muddled’ elections (Suberu 2007), elections conducted when democracy was in ‘retreat’ (Rawlence & Albin-Lackey 2007), ‘failed elections’ (International Crisis Group 2007) and as a ‘troubled transition’ from civilian-to-civilian regime (Africa Confidential 11 May 2007). The core reason for these negative portrayals is the elections were marred by all imaginable kinds of malfeasance.

In the build-up to the 2007 elections, political pundits were of the opinion that the polls were programmed to fail. The numeracy of politically motivated assassinations, inter- and intra-party feuds, interpersonal wrangling among politicians, the rickety preparations by INEC, and the undemocratic primaries conducted by virtually all 50 political parties that contested the elections all culminated in the 2007 electoral debacle. The utterances of ex-president Obasanjo flared political tension when he pronounced the elections as a do-or-die affair for the ruling PDP. The immediate interpretation of Obasanjo’s statement by opposition political parties and observers of Nigeria’s political transition at the time was that the April 2007 elections were damned to be non-transparent. This was because the then president and his ruling PDP had on their side control of all the state apparatuses of coercion and manipulation, such as the police, armed forces, security services, the Economic Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and INEC (Suberu 2007, p. 97). This apprehension was validated when the elections were indeed conducted in a most fraudulent manner.Prior to the 2007 elections, the huge sums of money raised by some political parties prepared the ground for a monetised electoral process. For instance, the ruling PDP raised a colossal amount of money from unverified sources, was unequalled by the money raised by all other parties combined. These funds were a cog in the wheels of the elections. For instance, a veteran politician in Abuja says political funding explains some of the fraud [committed in the 2007 elections]. He explained that the PDP is effectively 37 different parties – one for each state and one at the centre, each party raises its money, usually through corrupt deals between contractors and the state government.

Even after the PDP’s ‘victory’ in the 2007 polls, the party raised whopping sums of money unparalleled by any other party in Nigeria. On 15 November 2008 at a ceremony to raise funds for a new PDP secretariat project in Abuja, business tycoons such as Femi Otedola and Aliko Dangote reportedly contributed N1billion and N3billion respectively, and Strabag (a construction company in Nigeria) donated N100 million. An anonymous donor contributed N100 million (Okocha & Taiwo 2008). This manner of aggressive fundraising by political parties was the backbone of electoral malpractice in the 2007 polls, because donors could be sure to recoup their money through the award of contracts if the party they supported won the election (Aluaigba 2009b, p. 110). Moreover, in electioneering in Nigeria since 1999, ‘money is used to influence everyone involved in the election process, from INEC officials to party agents, security agents and the electorate’ (Bryan & Baer 2005, p. 101). Such practices were in vogue during the 2007 general elections.

A study on the conduct of the 2007 general elections (Aluaigba 2009a) indicates that electoral malpractices most prevalent during the elections were, in order of frequency, as follows: deliberate changing of election results, stuffing of ballot boxes, use of violence, misdeeds by security agents, connivance by polling officials and party agents to rig elections, intimidation of voters and vote buying. Other malpractices are shown in Figure 1 below. These included lack of secrecy in voting, false declaration of election results, snatching of ballot boxes, underage voting and so on. The occurrence of these corrupt practices was confirmed by both domestic and international observers who monitored the polls.

On the incidence of vote buying during the 2007 elections, another survey confirmed the sordid act when it reported that: In vote-buying transactions in Nigeria, voters are usually offered money (68 percent of all reported attempts in 2007), commodities (such as food or clothing, 26 percent) or jobs (6 percent). In the latest and previous Nigerian elections, the modal (i.e., most common) inducement was 500 naira, or about US$4. But the median price of a vote payment rose between 2003 and 2007, from 1,750 naira to 2,250 naira, largely because the proportion of large payments (10,000 naira or more per vote) increased over time.There was also tremendous use of violence during the elections, such that across the federation (and notably in Anambra, Delta, Jigawa, Katsina, Nasarawa, Ondo, and Osun States), violence surrounding the voting’s conduct or outcome took an estimated two-hundred lives, including those of 39 police officers. Arsonists struck the INEC offices, police stations, and the houses of local PDP leaders.

To ensure victory for the ruling party at all costs, there was premeditated effort to create an artificial shortage of voting materials in opposition areas, and the use of incumbency in the PDP-controlled states (Africa Research Bulletin 2007), to reduce the final number of votes for opposing political parties. As a corollary there were agitations by opposing political parties for a re-run of the elections after the PDP was declared the winner of the polls by INEC. The inference from these events was a general consensus by analysts and assessors of the conduct of the 2007 elections that democracy had been raped and the will of Nigerian voters subverted. This was done through the blatant obliteration of the trust Nigerians had bestowed on the security agents and the electoral umpire, INEC, despite the repeated assurances given to Nigerians by INEC chairman Professor Maurice Iwu that the electoral process would be free and fair to all.

The 2011 general elections were held on three different dates (9, 16 and 26) of April that year to elect members of the National Assembly, president, and governors or State Assembly members respectively. The first round of elections scheduled to take place on 2 April was postponed to 9 April. The reasons for the delay were described by INEC Chairman, Professor Attahiru M. Jega, as logistical problems (Akaeze 2011, p. 18) and an inevitable measure to forestall a shortage of election materials on election day. Prior to the election, predictions were rife among Nigerians with regard to the credibility of the 2011 polls, owing to the orgy of electoral fraud in past elections. However, the Jega-led INEC assuaged the fears of Nigerians, and by the end of the 2011 elections the general assessment of the polls, by both domestic and international observers, was that they had been relatively free and fair, and the results were more credible than those of the 1999, 2003 and 2007 polls.

The improvement in the credibility profile of the 2011 elections may be attributed to the new leadership of INEC, which was determined to reform the electoral body to enhance better administration of elections in Nigeria. Indeed, INEC was commended for the improvements recorded in logistics and the relatively smooth voting process during the polls, despite the initial disappointment occasioned by the postponement. The result of the elections ended the total dominance of the PDP, which had overwhelmingly held power since 1999. The party lost its two-thirds majority control of the Senate and won the governorship election in only 23 states out of 36, compared with the 2007 elections in which it had captured 27 states. Unlike in the previous elections, in which members of the National Assembly had substantially retained their seats, in the 2011 polls a good number of members lost their seats. For instance, 72 of the 109 senators lost their seats, and 260 of the 360 members of the House of Representatives also did not return to the house. These trends were indications of the piecemeal but holistic progress made by Nigeria in its march towards democratic consolidation.

Notwithstanding the successes achieved by INEC in the 2011 elections, on closer assessment the polls have been viewed as being far from free, fair and transparent according to international standards, because of the preponderance of electoral malpractice. The malpractices that reared their ugly heads during the 2011 ballot in Nigeria included late arrival of voting materials in many polling units, and incidents of ballot-box snatching and stuffing. Others were intimidation, arrest and detention of election observers, underage voting in some parts of the country and vote buying (Ibrahim 2011, p. 2; Jimoh & Olaniyi 2011, p. 4; Yusuf 2011, p. 31). Another serious shortfall during the elections was the inability of INEC to control the collation process. Most of the rigging took place at this stage of polling; hence, despite INEC’s innovative initiative that encouraged communities to monitor the collation of results, this could not materialize. This failure culminated in a declaration of false results in some places. For example, ‘there were a number of places where no voting took place but where results appear to have been compiled, including large parts of Idoma land in Benue South and also Isoko land and Warri in Delta State’ (Sahara Reporters 2011, p. 1). There was insufficient security at some polling stations, which led to the tragic death of nine National Youth Service Corps members who were serving as the INEC’s ad hoc staff in Bauchi State. The heavy security that was provided in some other violence-prone areas worked against the elections as voters were intimidated by the heavy presence of soldiers and stayed away from the polling stations.

Similar to this problem of insecurity, and more detrimental to Nigeria’s democratisation process, was the post-election violence in Northern Nigeria that claimed over 1000 lives. This further marked the elections as the bloodiest in Nigeria’s electoral history. On 18 April 2011, following the announcement of the presidential election results in favour of the ruling PDP candidate President Goodluck Jonathan, there were reported cases of rioting in some cities in Northern Nigeria – including Kano, Katsina and Yola. The riot spread to 14 states in the region but was most severe in Adamawa, Bauchi, Kaduna, Kano, Nasarawa and some parts of Niger. The protesters attacked residences of PDP stalwarts as well as businesses, churches, and in some cases mosques in reprisal attacks. As observed by Aniekwe and Kushie (2011, p. 6), electoral violence can be prompted by voters’ frustration arising from the fear of unwarranted defeat because of a corrupt electioneering process or injustice in electoral dispute adjudication by the judiciary. These factors fuelled the post-2011 election violence in Northern Nigeria.

The 2015 general elections

The 2015 general elections in Nigeria, conducted on 28 March and 11 April 2015, have been described as the best in Nigeria’s electoral history (Gabriel 2015). This election was rated highly by both domestic and international observers because of the comprehensive preparations made and the relatively peaceful and proper conduct of the polls by INEC. Indeed, the characterisation of the 2015 polls as credible was the result of innovations and the introduction of technology in the electoral process by INEC. For instance, prior to the election itself there was the use of biometric voters’ registration. During the actual polls, INEC introduced the Smart Card Reader. Also, sensitive electoral materials such as the result sheets and ballot papers were customized and possessed high security features and codes. However, despite these great improvements in the electoral process, evidence indicates that the 2015 elections were not totally flawless.

Some of the shortcomings related to operational deficiencies on the part of INEC were ‘late arrival of election materials, overcrowding, failure of the card reader, result manipulation and voting of under-aged in some units in the Northern part of the country’ (Udu 2015, p. 102). Other electoral malpractices evident during the 2015 polls were snatching of electoral materials and ballot boxes by thugs, and inflation of election figures. For example, in Akwa Ibom State ‘approximately 430,000 voters were accredited to vote in that state for Governor and State House of Assembly. The cancellation and order to conduct new gubernatorial elections in states such as Akwa Ibom and Rivers in December 2015, issued by the Appeal Court and Election Tribunal respectively, suggests that these electoral vices did occur during the March and April polls. However, Nigeria’s Supreme Court eventually upheld the Akwa Ibom and Rivers governorship elections. This final decision corroborates the general assessment of the 2015 polls in Nigeria as one of the most credible in the country’s electoral history.

What is obvious from the above review of elections in Nigeria since 1999 is that none of them can be absolved from venality, falsehood and duplicity occasioned by flagrant usurpation of electoral laws and abuse of the will of Nigerian electorate. As discussed in the next section, these electoral malpractices have grave consequences for the nature of governance Nigerians have experienced since 1999. These negative effects in turn affect the quality of democracy being moulded in the country since the military vacated power years ago. Apart from desecrating the values of democracy that are built on transparency, accountability and good governance, electoral malpractices have dispelled the hopes of Nigerian citizens. At the resurgence of democracy in 1999, Nigerians’ optimism hinged on reaping the dividends of democracy that would manifest in improving the living conditions of the people.